AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF SMALL STATE THEORIES TO THE STUDY OF NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the validity of applying traditional small state theories to the study of New Zealand foreign policy. Increasingly such theories have been the target of criticisms which highlight their inability to account for diversity amongst states, as well as their failure to acknowledge the changing international environment. Critics stress the increased levels of interdependence that they believe provides more opportunities for small states to overcome the constraints they face thus rendering their propositions obsolete. To ascertain whether such criticisms are valid this paper applies small state theories to two ten year periods of New Zealand's foreign policy, 1944-1954 and 1984-1994. Evidence of the characteristics associated with small states are identified in both periods yet in significant areas its foreign policy behaviour diverged from that expected. In these incidences it is necessary to acknowledge the influence of variables from other theoretical perspectives utilised in the study of foreign policy and the interaction that occurs between these different perspectives. Thus whilst not rendering small state theories obsolete, the application of variables from alternative theories to the study of its foreign policy enables a more comprehensive multicausal examination than that provided by small state theories alone. New Zealand in both periods exhibited the characteristics of a small state and was therefore constrained in the way such theories identify, yet due to the changes in the international environment, and it's unique historical and geographical position, it was able to overcome these constraints. It is therefore necessary to be aware of alternative perspectives when applying small state theories to the study of New Zealand's foreign policy. The impact of environmental and societal determinants must be acknowledged, as must the focus be turned within small state theories from that of viability, to include the potential benefits small size can offer in an international arena increasingly characterised by interdependence.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally in the study of New Zealand's foreign policy it has been theories relating to size, specifically small state theories, which have been the chief analytical tools utilised. These theories seek to explain foreign policy behaviour by focusing on the constraints experienced by small states in the international arena and the corresponding impact this has upon policy options, direction and implementation. They identify similarities in the experience of small states which therefore enable theorists to predict behaviour. However increasingly the use of size-based explanations for the foreign policy of states has come under scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Some such as Thakur believe small state theories "confuse more than clarify"[1]. Others point to changes in the world order, a diffusion of power and control, as being responsible for causing such models to become increasingly irrelevant. Changes in the conventional global power structure, and the rise of interdependence, may be seen to override the constraints traditionally believed to bind small state behaviour in the international arena thus rendering them obsolete. Changes too caused by decolonisation and the dramatic rise in the number and diversity of small and micro states, has meant such a grouping is increasingly heterogeneous and as such "cannot be expected to respond in the same way to similar stimuli"[2].

Criticism too has been directed at the central premise of small state theories, that there is a commonality of experience that causes a small state to act in its foreign policy initiatives in a similar, predictable manner to other small states. Clark and Payne for example suggest that although the behaviour of small states appears distinctive in some respects in others it is not that different from the behaviour of larger states[3]. The interests of small states they maintain correspond with the interests of all states regardless of size. The defining criteria for small states is also problematic as illustrated by New Zealand's position in the Pacific. Although traditional perceived to be a small state, within the South Pacific it is evidently a developed state both economically and politically and compared to its island neighbours relatively large.

The use of small state theories as an analytical tool to explain New Zealand foreign policy is therefore increasingly questionable. Not only do its recent foreign policy initiatives show clear divergence's away from the predicted behaviour of small states but its unique position economically, historically and geographically call into question some of the basic assumptions made in the literature relating to small state theories. This study will therefore examine the relevance of applying conventional small state theories to the study of New Zealand's foreign policy in light of this criticism as well as

the changes that are evident in both the existing world structure and in its own perception of itself as an independent nation.

To ascertain whether size-based explanations of New Zealand foreign policy are indeed still viable this paper will initially examine the background to the study of foreign policy and international relations before reviewing the literature on small state theories themselves to establish the characteristics attributed to such states, and the corresponding impact of these upon policy formulation. An overview of the criticisms levelled at these theories will then be made and an alternative approach, aimed at meeting these criticisms, outlined. Examination will then be made of two particular time periods in New Zealand history focusing on the foreign policy initiatives it followed, the reasons why and if these can be seen to correspond to the behaviour traditional small state theories prescribe. The first period to be examined will be from 1944-1954. The Department of External Affairs had just been established at this time and New Zealand was beginning to develop, where it had not before, a more independent foreign policy outlook. However New Zealand still clearly identified itself with Europe and existed within tight security and trade arrangements with a small number of powerful allies. The second period to be examined will be from 1984-1994 and will thus endeavour to encapsulate the changes that occurred as a result of the break in the Cold War and the corresponding diffusion of power. By analysing two such time periods therefore, an examination can be made as to the relevance over time of applying traditional small state theories to the study of New Zealand's foreign policy. The alternative approach which aims at extending traditional small state theories, by examining how variables from other perspectives interact in the formulation of foreign policy, can also be tested.

For the purposes of this study the area of foreign policy examined will be confined to matters relating to security. This will not only aid in limiting the breadth of the study but also maintains the focus on the area which small state theorists believe set such states apart from their larger counterparts, namely the limitations they face in attaining security. With regard to New Zealand, and corresponding to characteristics identified by small state theorists, economic and trade concerns will be included in the study as they are closely tied to the search for security, particularly in the latter period.

Such an examination of the validity of size-based explanations of foreign policy should prove useful for a number of reasons. Not only will it provide insight into the impact that the changing international environment and other factors can have upon small

state behaviour but also how these effect the validity of conventional theories. Considering the increased questioning of small state theories this examination will provide an opportunity to ascertain whether these criticisms can be seen to hold true in the case of New Zealand. Thus by studying the actions of a small state such as New Zealand and the factors both domestically and internationally that have shaped its foreign policy, the usefulness of small state theories as a conceptual framework can be tested.

ENDNOTES

(1)Thakur, R. "The Elusive Essence of Size: Australia, New Zealand and Small States in International Relations" in International Relations: Global and Australian Perspective's on an Evolving Discipline. Editors Higgott, R. and Richardson, J.L. Canberra Studies in World Affairs, Canberra 1991:241.

(2)ibid:282.

(3)Clarke, C. & Payne, T. (eds.) Politics and Development in Small States. Allen and Unwin, London 1989:22.

CHAPTER ONE:

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the study of foreign policy analysts attempt to develop a better understanding of what motivates states to act in the international arena in the way that they do, and this in turn enables them to, as Jensen claims, "make more accurate predictions about international events and in so doing respond more effectively to such events"[1]. To do so, however, it is necessary to begin by employing certain tools to analyse the factors that shape the external behaviour of states. Due to the range of information available this is not an easy task. A variety of approaches and models have developed and are currently utilised in the field of foreign policy analysis to make the study of international relations more scientific and thus more fruitful. Post World War One, two paradigms, the Realist and the Idealist, dominated the field but with the behavioural revolution of the 1950's a third approach emerged.

REALIST

The realist approach, emerging from the Hobbesian tradition, focuses on the nation-state and its struggle to survive in an international arena characterised by anarchy and conflict. In its assertion that the central concept characterising the international system is power this model attempts to explain international relations in terms of an inter-state struggle for power. "Realism emphasises the role of states as legally independent and sovereign actors, competing with one another for power in a world of conflict and possible war"[2]. Within this system states must rely upon their own resources to ensure survival as political integration between states is short-lived and the impact of transnational actors insignificant[3]. As each state struggles to defend its territory and interests the question of security dominates the hierarchy of issues in international politics and power becomes the most important concept in predicting behaviour. On this basis theories developed that sought to compare behaviour across various state units and look for patterns of behaviour associated with types of states. The primary area of study therefore is the interplay of states on the international stage with three central assumptions underlying the paradigm. "First, states are sufficiently similar for them to be appropriately treated as a single category of actors; secondly that governments of states are effectively in control of internal developments and external behaviour; and thirdly, that outcomes in the international arena are arrived at mainly as a result of the behaviour and interplay of states not of any other actors or of any other processes than state interaction"[4].

The focus of study in the Realist approach is therefore the nation-state and the factors which impinge upon its capacity to implement and enforce foreign policy decisions. As

Handel maintained when studying states "it is important to analyse their respective capacities to protect, maintain or further their national interests"[5]. The capacity to act independently involves an equation which combines an analysis of the resources a state commands, its ability to use them and its predisposition to act with the range of choices available. Every state can be seen to have constraints laid upon it which mitigate its freedom to act. Such freedom "is a relative thing, conditioned by factors and circumstances which states can and do modify by their actions but which they cannot wholly control or escape from"[6].

Theories developed therefore, that focussed upon the factors which impinge upon a states capacity to implement and enforce foreign policy decisions. By acknowledging a central assumption, that all states have similar interests but that out of necessity they modify their actions due to the resources available and the power they are able to wield, distinctions are made between states, and groups formed based upon the nature of the constraints they face and the corresponding limits these place upon their capacity to act. Groups of states so identified would therefore be seen to demonstrate certain common, irreducible and specific characteristics and correspond to certain broad patterns of behaviour. The groupings would also indicate "the limits beyond which the paradigm members of the stated class will tend to incur abnormal or counter-productive costs in pursuit of a certain type of policy"[7].

Proponents of this approach identify key areas in which the capacity to act can be seen to influence foreign policy behaviour:

(1)Limitations on a nation's resources will place limitations on the foreign policy activities of that nation.

(2)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the greater proportion of its foreign policy energy will be directed to substantive problem areas involving economic matters.

(3)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the narrower the scope of action of its foreign policy behaviour.

(4)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the larger the proportion of foreign policy behaviour taking place in a multilateral setting.

(5)The lower a nation's capacity to act, the greater proportion of high commitment and high negative affect in its foreign policy behaviour[8].

Small state theories, falling as they do within this approach, focus upon these factors and their potential influence, as shall be examined.

IDEALIST

Proponents of the Idealist perspective disagree with the Realist view that international relations are necessarily anarchic believing that "international disputes, like those occurring within civil society, could and should be mitigated, adjudicated or resolved through the application of generally recognised rules and procedures"[9]. Idealists posit an international society that recognises such concepts as sovereign status, sovereign equality, non-intervention and the right to national self-defence. With the use of such tools as international institutions, collective security, international laws and mutual aid proponents of this approach perceived a 'new world order' characterised by cooperation between states[10].

Since World War Two the Idealist perspective has emphasised the growing evidence of interdependence in the international political arena and the corresponding impact this has had upon the nature of international relations. The plethora of international organisations that have been established, as with the economic, technological and cultural processes of global change, have resulted in the weakening of state boundaries[11]. Such developments, theorists believe, have rendered the state unable to act autonomously to the extent Realist theories base their analysis upon. The traditional notion of sovereignty which assumes "that the state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and limits imposed upon it by actors, agencies and forces operating within its territorial boundaries" is, through the processes of increased 'globalisation', being challenged[12]. Even the most powerful of states have become vulnerable to penetration and as such the distinction between domestic and foreign policy has become blurred.

Kegley and Wittkopf identify the characterising features of interdependence which, they maintain, impact upon a state's foreign policy. They focus on the multiple channels of communication that have developed between societies both formally and informally and the increased number and variety of issues concerned. All states are as a consequence limited in their foreign policy by these connections as well as by the transnational and transgovernmental actors who not only increase the potential cost of certain action but also increasingly force domestic issues on to the international stage. "The attitudes and policy stands of domestic groups are likely to be affected by communications, organised or not, between them and counterparts abroad"[13]. Kegley and Wittkopf maintain that in such an environment the use of military force has become a far more costly foreign policy instrument. Where force was seen as an acceptable instrument of policy in the realist model it is, due to interdependence, increasingly costly in an international arena characterised by the emerging pre-

eminence of trade and economics[14]. The traditional advantages of size now compete with economic power, product distribution and the increased potential for cooperation between smaller states. It can be seen, therefore, that as the international structure has changed so has the power hierarchy within the system and the interactive patterns exhibited. International organisations and the structures they put in place such as legal and moral norms not only define salient issues but shape the strategies adopted. They provide for cooperation and political integration thus enabling states to overcome the limitations they face standing alone, in turn affecting their foreign policy outputs.

DECISION-MAKING THEORIES

With the behavioural revolution of the 1950's and in light of increased criticism of the Realist approach which had come to dominate the post World War Two study of international relations, theories that focussed on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy developed. The Realist approach was criticised as being oversimplified, in that domestic and international actors were ignored, and as such this approach was believed to be of minimal explanatory value[15]. The central assumption harnessed to the Realist approach, the rational actor model, was also criticised. The rational actor model views states as unitary, monolithic and solitary actors on the international stage[16]. Individual decision makers and the decision making process of a state are seen to be inconsequential in that it is assumed that decisions are the result of a rational process of utility maximisation. "Foreign policy decisions are made by decision makers who carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages likely to follow from alternative policies"[17]. As such an action-reaction model is postulated whereby a state's actions are seen as the rational, calculated response to a move made by another[18]. Conflict arises therefore only when there is a genuine difference of interests between states, not because of irrational choices. Rational actor models however, in assuming the state is a unitary actor, fail to look at domestic influences that may impact upon foreign policy decisions such as the leaders, type of government, characteristics of the society or the political conditions[19]. By assuming rationality, factors such as physical impediments to the flow of information and the distortion of reality caused by attitudes, beliefs or faulty expectations in decision makers are ignored. Assumptions therefore that decisions are the result of a rational weighing up of advantages and disadvantages fail to acknowledge the impediments that can bound rationality.

With the vast increase in newly independent states since World War Two, and the affect this had upon the international environment, criticism also highlighted the Euro-centric nature of such models and their relevance to the variety of states that have

emerged. Increasingly therefore the need for more comprehensive theories that sought to understand foreign policy not simply in terms of the capacity to act but as a result of a state's relationship with all aspects of its environment, both domestically and internationally, was acknowledged. Partly in response to these criticisms theories that focus on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy developed. These theories "offered not so much a new paradigm as more rigorous methods of enquiry"[20]. Theorists focus on a wide variety of factors involved in foreign policy, from how decisions are made and implemented to how the external environment and external actors influence the process[21]. These approaches utilise a behavioural, rather than a Realist approach to the study of foreign policy, in which the state becomes its decision makers[22]. Factors that limit rationality are identified and examined in an attempt to understand decision making to an extent Rational Actor Models fail to address.

Organisational Processes

Within the decision making model emphasis is placed on the individuals and organisations involved in the formulation of foreign policy as decisions are seen as less the result of deliberate choice than as the output of a large organisation with established patterns of behaviour[23]. The standard operating procedures of the organisations within a government are believed to shape foreign policy outputs through a process of interaction and adjustment. The actor is no longer seen as a monolithic nation, rather as a constellation of organisations only partly coordinated by government leaders[24]. Analysts recognise not only standard operating procedures within such organisations but also relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, perceptions and issues which act to shape foreign policy[25]. Advocates of this approach therefore maintain that an examination of a states organisational structure can offer significant insight into the policies they produce.

Bureaucratic Politics

Building on the organisational model are bureaucratic theories which emphasise the role of the bureaucrats involved in the decision making process. As the individuals responsible for providing information and advice to policy makers, as well as implementing the decisions made, the potential to shape policy is evident. Bureaucratic politics therefore examines "foreign policy as if it resulted from the interaction of individual bureaucrats playing political games to advance both their own and their organisations interests"[26]. Decisions, rather than representing a rational calculation, are the result of bargaining amongst individuals "who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national,

organisational and personal goals"[27]. The resulting output is therefore a compromise shaped by both organisational processes and the individual political skill of the players. Proponents of this approach examine the interplay between the individuals involved in the development and implementation of foreign policy in an attempt to more fully understand its origins whilst also acknowledging the affects of bargaining between the organisational units within the state.

Human Dimensions

The narrowing of the focus of examination to the individual decision maker, as seen in the bureaucratic model, is taken further in models with their roots in the psychological and cognitive field. In the examination of foreign policy these theories look at the impact of idiosyncratic or personality differences in those responsible. Cognition, defined as the acquiring, organising and using of knowledge, becomes the focus for explaining the variations and aberrations evident in the performance of decision makers[28]. Holsti refers to the gap between 'image' and 'reality' resulting from physical impediments to the flow of information and other factors which distort reality in the individual therefore rendering the psychological environment different from the physical reality[29]. Clark and White divide the study into descriptive and psychological explanations with the former focusing on human cognition while the latter examines consistency and motivational theories[30]. Cybernetic theories of decision making, developed by Steinbruner, also address the cognitive processes of the individuals concerned claiming that when faced with a complex problem an institutional approach aimed at minimising the calculations involved is often adopted[31]. The final output therefore reflects this selective process, which utilises only a small set of critical variables. Theories that identify the cognitive processes of the individuals involved as having a key impact on the decisions made, and in turn the study of foreign policy, are however criticised for their lack of theoretical development and coherence. Clarke and White identify the "limited understanding of the relationship between perception and behaviour and of the circumstances in which cognitive aberrations are likely to have a significant impact upon foreign policy"[32].

Environmental /Societal Determinants

Still within the decision making paradigm are theories that relate to the environment in which decision makers operate and how this can affect foreign policy outputs. Political structures and societal characteristics such as national character, nationalism, societal structure and stability all impact on foreign policy in that they impose constraints and provide opportunities[33]. By remaining relatively stable they provide continuity in a field characterised by constant fluctuations. Other factors that shape individual's belief

systems are also examined as they provide the "prism through which decision makers view reality"[34]. Historical tradition, collective experiences and specific political beliefs generate the range of options considered thus influencing the formulation of foreign policy. The geographical location of a state is also considered to be an influential factor in the formulation of its foreign policy. "Leaders' perceptions of available foreign policy options are influenced by the geopolitical circumstances that define their countries' place on the world stage"[35]. Shared national frontiers and close proximity to other states, especially to great powers, are believed to have a direct impact on the level of intervention and involvement in world affairs a state exhibits. Similarly the impact of external actors and the structures of the international system are considered as decision makers take into account the wider political context. As with the Realist approach, an action-reaction model is adopted that examines the levels of reciprocation in foreign policy behaviour and the affect this has on decision makers[36].

The specific circumstances surrounding a decision also warrant consideration according to proponents of this theory. The situational context aids in an understanding of the decisions made. For example in a crisis situation the number of individuals involved in the process tends to decrease and less alternatives are presented thus resulting in an output that is therefore not necessarily the product of a high degree of bargaining and compromise as bureaucratic theories maintain[37]. All of these factors are viewed as determinants in the decision making approach and are therefore examined in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive explanation for foreign policy outputs.

There is debate however as to the relative potency of internal versus external variables in accounting for foreign policy. Theorists such as Reynolds criticise the micro- or internal level of analysis for exaggerating the differences between states while the system-oriented model he believes tends to produce a black box concept of the units with a high degree of determinism[38]. Others stress the need to focus on interaction between the levels of analysis and the variables they encompass. East, Salmore and Hermann state that it "seems unlikely that examining the relationships between a single perspective and foreign policy behaviour will produce an adequate explanation of these external behaviours"[39]. By reviewing the process of foreign policy formulation through a series of different analytical paradigms, at the human level, the state level and the international systemic level, all aspects of a states environment can be taken into account and the relationship between the domestic and international systemic constraints acknowledged. Whilst system variables are largely responsible for setting the context within which a nation's capacity to act is defined the impact of other

internal variables, ranging from the influence of regime characteristics and organisational framework on the ability to use resources to the leaders perceptions of the opportunities and constraints that exist, mediate the relationship between these and foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, it seems unlikely that studying foreign policy from a single perspective will produce a suitably comprehensive, multicausal, explanation.

SMALL STATE THEORIES

Having thus outlined the broad theoretical framework in the study of foreign policy, small state theories clearly fall within models relating to the capacity to act. East, Salmore and Hermann define a states capacity to act as a function of its amount of resources, its ability to utilise the resources and its predisposition to act[40]. Differences in the capacity to act between states, manifests in substantive differences in foreign policy, and it is upon this basis that small state theories have developed. Reynolds, in placing the influences upon foreign policy on a continuum ranging from those of a constant nature to the more volatile, locates factors such as size on the more constant end, as it provides a relatively stable and constant influence over time[41]. Due to this fact, and as these theories continue to dominate the literature on New Zealand foreign policy, it is necessary to study them in more detail.

Small state theories focus upon the constraints small size impose and the corresponding effect this has upon the capacity of such states to protect, maintain or further their national interests. The unique conditions often experienced by small states, such as their limited human and material resources, their economic dependence through trade, and an inability to physically defend their own territory, become the constraints that analysts believe come to characterise small state foreign policy. Although the characteristics of small state behaviour are generally agreed upon as shall be examined, there is evident a lack of consensus on how to define small and which, if any, indicators of size should be utilised. The development of a theory on small states is made more difficult by the fact that on the methodological level 'smallness' can be approached either relationally or attributively.

Defining a 'small state'

Many theorists acknowledge the arbitrary nature of such a distinction but nevertheless attempt to set criteria. Sutton and Payne believe that the concept of smallness, being relative "will continually undergo revision according to the configuration of the international system at the time and the particular characteristics of the small state

which are being examined"[42]. Maintaining that the capacity to act is a function of both the amount of resources a state commands and its ability to utilise these resources Fauriol concluded two variables of size must be considered- "the resources and power base of states (population, territorial power, military resources) and national development issues (GNP per capita, industrialisation, energy use etc.)"[43]. East also divides the capacity to act into two general factors- size and the level of social organisation[44]. Whilst size taps the total resources potentially available, social organisation examines the internal characteristics of a state. Population size has however been generally accepted in much of the literature as the most fruitful point of departure as it is population size that indicates the limits and potential of a state. Territorial size is not always pertinent as land mass does not always equate with low population levels, the United Kingdom for example. Economic development also proves somewhat problematic as there are examples of states with small territorial size and small populations yet strong, developed economies. Thus to enable comparative analysis it is population that shall be utilised as the defining characteristic of 'small state'. As Purnell states, population is the most important resource of a state and is the chief means by which a state can attempt to meet its needs and fulfil its desires[45]. Reynolds, while agreeing that size is indicative of a states limits and potential, stresses that the use of such statistics by themselves are of little value as they are significant only in relation to all other elements of a states situation[46]. Widening the criteria to include other elements would however, whilst meeting the criticisms levelled at this theoretical approach, take the model beyond the traditional boundaries of the Realist perspective from which it was developed. By adhering to the most widely accepted criteria small state theories can be studied in their traditional sense and through application the impact of, and interaction between, other variables will more easily be identified.

This established it is necessary to employ a population cut-off point which distinguishes small states. The Commonwealth Secretariat has generally employed a cut-off point of less than one million while conceding that this ideally might be too narrow a conception[47]. It then goes on to include in its study Jamaica with a population of over two million and Papua New Guinea (population over three million) arguing that they share characteristics and maintain integral links with all small states in their respective regions. Sutton and Payne point out that the limit may depend upon the area the categoriser is specialising in and claim that for political scientists a population cut-off point of five million would be suitable whilst further distinguishing a smaller category, the micro-state[48]. They criticise the Commonwealth Secretariats one million population cut-off point as being in response to changes in the international

system which during the 1960s saw a dramatic rise in the number of states with populations of less than one million being granted independence. Instead of including these in a micro-state category the response was simply to lower the overall cut-off point. Since any consideration of size is "based on the underlying idea that the essence of smallness is either a lack of influence on the environment and a lack of immunity against influences from it or both" a fixed population level of five million will be used in this instance as the criteria for inclusion in the category of 'small state' with a further distinction of micro-states existing within this[49].

If one examines New Zealand in the light of such deliberation the central paradox is evident. Traditionally it has unquestionably been allocated the status of small state. This primarily arose from a close identification with the developed world from which it drew its values and aspirations as well as political and constitutional traditions. By the standards of the OECD (Europe-based Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development) New Zealand is indeed small. However this perception alters somewhat when one considers the regional position and perspective. Compared with the myriad of Pacific Nations New Zealand is a large, developed state. If one looks at the list of nations recognised by the United Nations it would appear half way down the list if ranked according to population size[50]. The large marine territory it commands also confuses the perception of size. However a cut-off point must be established, albeit arbitrary, to enable comparative analysis. By utilising population as the criteria and setting the cut-off point at five million the use of small state models in the study of New Zealand foreign policy is in theory made valid however closer examination is required to see if this is appropriate and if the characteristics they prescribe provide an explanation for the direction of its foreign policy.

The characteristics of a small state

So what exactly are the characteristics small state theories prescribe, how are these characteristics peculiar to small states, and how do they effect foreign policy decision making? From reviewing the literature several basic conditions are seen to exist in many small states which in turn effect the capacity of such states to act independently. Primarily these are a result of the economic and resource limitations many small states face. Although not experienced by all, limitations in both human and material resources leave many small states in positions of vulnerability and, due to these limitations, unable to meet their security needs. Economically small states are often faced with home markets that are not large enough to sustain self-sufficient economic growth and that provide limited opportunities to diversify. This in turn is compounded by their narrow resource base and the difficulties presented in attaining penetration

into foreign markets. As a result most small states find themselves dependent on trade and within this even more constrained by the product and market concentration which often characterises small state trading patterns[51]. Small state theorists do not claim that these limitations exist for all small states and acknowledge clear examples to the contrary such as Singapore. However they postulate that such conditions and limitations can be observed with enough regularity to justify a model based upon such an assumption of common experience. These conditions therefore give rise to certain characteristics that are peculiar to small states.

An example of one such common experience is the resulting openness that small state dependence on international trade renders necessary. This leads to a conspicuous vulnerability in the position of small states to adverse trends internationally whilst at the same time they lack the capacity to exert any influence over such trends. This external economic dependence therefore leads to sensitivity and instability within a small state that not only heightens the risk of foreign penetration but also by its very nature can erode a small states independence and autonomy[52]. Small states thus often find their economic security dependent upon foreign actors whose behaviour is not subject to their authority and as a direct result small state foreign policy cannot afford to be isolated from its trade concerns and priorities. Often therefore when dealing with trading partners, and in most affairs in the international arena, for small states "independence of mind and policies in such situations are thought a commodity too costly"[53]. The focus of a small state's foreign policy is as such often characterised by a clear economic focus and a tight connection between domestic and external affairs. Security for a small state, as reflected in its foreign policy, is therefore evidently more concerned with attaining economic security and thus demonstrates a broader conception of threat than that of larger powers[54]. "Thus the cost of continued viability as a national entity is often political quiescence, compromise, or the sacrifice of political principles to economic necessity"[55].

When one turns to physical or military security the limitations that small states face are clearly evident. Small states due to their limited resources both materially and in human terms often lack the capacity to physically defend their territory or meet their security needs. Militarily for a small state it is difficult to maintain a modern, conventional military establishment without over-reaching its resource capabilities. However as some sense of security is a pre-condition of independent action and autonomous decision-making, small states must look for other means to attain security without compromising to too great an extent their political independence and freedom[56]. For small states this is often in the form of an association or alliance which

can act to offset the costs involved in providing security and provides a total expenditure possible that would normally far exceed a small states potential. There is however a clear down side to such defence arrangements in that a small state thus committed may find itself involved in costly conflicts beyond its regional area of concern or be expected to take part in defence planning inappropriate to its own needs. Even more significant, a small state in such an alliance or association may find it does in fact act in such a way that it further impinges upon the states independence to act autonomously.

Thus small states tend to look further to the security provided by international laws and organisations in their quest to attain greater security. Such laws and organisations provide for small states a cost efficient means of pursuing their interests in the international arena. Small states, by their very nature and the limitations they face, are typically characterised by a limited ability to change conditions in the international environment. This coupled with their vulnerability to external pressure usually renders them less viable as an independent member of the international community[57]. However by emphasising international law and taking an active role in international organisations, small states are able to exert influence internationally and pursue their national interests in a wider international context. This influence as such may be disproportionate to the actual size and leverage that the state maintains. For a small state international laws also "constitute a handy moral, if not actual, defence against intervention"[58]. International organisations provide a framework within which small states can build coalitions and pursue collective bargaining whilst the costs of the collective security and enforcement they provide are generally borne by the major powers involved. Thus small states see "in strong support for international law and the operations of international organisations the best safeguards for long-term security"[59]. Within international organisations small states look to maximise their influence by collaborating with others that have similar interests. Small states therefore are often involved in a higher rate of multilateral initiatives within international organisations and initiate more co-operative events[60].

The resource constraints experienced by small states are also reflected in the nature, operation and effectiveness of their diplomatic service. The limits that small size places on the human and economic resources at their disposal means small state foreign policy is often limited in range and extent. "The size and professionalism of a country's diplomatic service often provides a measure of the weight a state carries within the international system, indicating the level of human and economic resources it is able and willing to commit in search of international influence"[61]. Due to the constraints

they face therefore the foreign policy initiatives of a small state tend to be narrow in scope to enable a greater concentration of their scarce resources on the areas of greatest concern. This does however give small states an advantage in that, unlike larger states which are often involved in a number of important foreign policy initiatives concurrently, they are able to concentrate all their energies on a single issue and as a result can have a better knowledge of the issues and fewer distractions[62]. However small states do not have at their disposal the same foreign policy instruments that a larger state may wield. For example large states can reward and punish whereas small states are forced to confine themselves to diplomatic instruments such as persuasion and the pursuing of a moral stance that incur less in the way of costs.

Thus small state foreign policy is characterised by the use of certain tools which are utilised through necessity as they carry with them less in the way of costs. For example by focusing on international legal norms small states are able to utilise cheap and unthreatening rhetoric which as such is less likely to anger or alienate important allies or trading partners. Not only therefore is small state foreign policy often limited in range but it must be by nature carefully managed to minimise risks and reduce the impact of policy failure. Small states have essentially the same interests as large states but must in their foreign policy initiatives make modifications to reflect their resource limitations and power disparities[63]. They are therefore more likely to take low-profile action to minimise both the risks involved and the expenditure of their scarce resources.

At this point however there are differences in the literature on small state foreign policy, with some theorists such as Thakur, positing an alternative model which sees small states as being involved in less ambiguous and more high-risk behaviour precisely because of the resource limitations they face[64]. Such theories postulate that because small states lack the diplomatic tools to perceive events and developments in the international arena quickly enough they are then left with fewer policy options and as a result are often forced to adopt far less ambiguous and more specific behaviour. Maurice East made a study of just such claims which appeared to support this alternative theory although he himself acknowledged the need for further research[65].

Within the foreign policy units of small states therefore business is often carried out on a different scale than in a larger state. The lack of adequate information gathering effects not only the capacity to prepare and chose alternatives but the machinery itself is smaller and as such policy formulation may lack institutionalisation. As such there

may be a more personal influence on policy making which can easily develop an element of passion and personal involvement not evident in larger states. "There is a greater likelihood that it be the product of a single, dominant mind and less that of a committee striving for a comprehensive view"[66]. This can however prove to be advantageous allowing for far greater flexibility and responsiveness than may be evident within the foreign policy units of larger states.

Small size therefore, and the constraints it imposes upon a states foreign policy formulation, falls under the propositions relating to the capacity to act. The limitations on a small states resources result in limitations on its foreign policy activities. The focus of its foreign policy is narrow out of necessity and within this a high proportion relates to economic matters. The foreign policy tools utilised reflect the need to avoid high costs, such as an emphasis on international laws and organisations as well as the use of alliances and associations to offset the costs associated with achieving security. The nature, operation and effectiveness of a small states diplomatic service is also effected. This some contend may result in small states exhibiting more aggressive foreign policy behaviour as the result of a lack of adequate intelligence, misinformation or the dominance of any given individual within the machinery. Therefore due to the characteristics of size that limit a small states capacity to act, size becomes the factor which "sets the limits to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other"[67]. The constraints that small states have laid upon them by nature of their very size are what make their policies qualitatively different and that set them apart within the international arena. However small state theories have increasingly come under questioning for a variety of reasons which must also be examined.

Criticisms levelled at small state theories

Much of the earliest literature produced on small state theories originated from studies conducted in, and focusing on, European states. This in itself many find problematic as the models they put forward are by nature Euro-centric and therefore it may be suspect to apply their propositions to other small states. This is of particular relevance when one looks at the vast increase in the number of small states that emerged following the de-colonisation movement of the 1960s and the historical and environmental differences that exist between these states and those in Europe that small state theories were modelled on [68].Thus the increasingly diverse membership of the category 'small state' may some maintain make it more difficult to assign any common denominator other than their overall weakness [69]. Small states in the 1990s

can be seen to exhibit a variety of diplomatic styles, varying political complexions and diverse international allegiances therefore bringing into question the assumption that they will respond in the same way to similar stimuli [70]. Small states in more isolated parts of the world may also find it easier to escape the constraints traditionally associated with size thus enabling them to free themselves from "the historical cobwebs in re-conceptualising security concerns and survival strategies" [71]. However despite these criticisms many of the constraints small states face, regardless of their location or political orientation, would seem to have remained the same. The nature of the threats to security they perceive may alter with time and place but the basic limitations that small size will place upon possible responses remain. Small state theories have never tried to claim all states will respond in a similar fashion to similar stimuli rather they postulate that if a small state chooses to act in a way that shows little regard as to its limitations it will incur abnormal or counter-productive costs. Thus there exists the potential for making predictions.

Another difficulty posed by the hegemonic position of the existing theoretical literature on small states is a tendency to approach small states from the point of view of smallness being problematic[72]. In the early literature small state viability is often the central concern. As Thakur points out, changes in the international system since small state theories first came into prominence have made this focus on viability increasingly redundant. "With the security of a state not challenged, theories originating in the security dilemma cannot explain the state's behaviour"[73]. The decrease in the second half of the twentieth century of the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states due to supranational organisations such as the United Nations have given small states both a more equal standing internationally as well as creating an important means by which to bypass some of the problems created by size [74]. Small states in the twentieth century also experience greater political power vis-à-vis larger states some maintain due to international opinion which, with the advances in technology and media capability, serve to limit the independent actions of all states [75]. The problems of political organisation and control traditionally associated with small size have eased with the development of modern means of communication and transport[76].

Recent criticisms of small state theories also perceive these changes in the international system as providing, for small states, a greater opportunity to carry out independent foreign policy that traditional small state theories do not take into account. Not only do international organisations such as the United Nations offer small states an arena for international contact with the chance to express political views and even exert a disproportionate influence, but as the international environment has become less

aligned, constraints that existed in the past appear to have lessened in influence[77]. Greater regionalism and fragmentation of nation-states on the international stage also mean that small states receive less attention from the great powers, there is less fear of escalation of disputes and a greater number of international actors and organisations have come into existence which act to diffuse power and authority[78]. For small states this means theoretically that they are less constrained in their actions than in the past and thus the usefulness of traditional models that use these constraints as a point of departure must be questioned. However when assessing such criticisms one must bear in mind the struggle international organisations such as the United Nations face when it comes to deciding on and then enforcing any of their declarations and therefore take care not to overemphasis their influence. Small states within such organisations still find themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to initiating policy issues and more often than not still have to rely on the support of others to push their objectives.

Further criticisms levelled at small state theories maintain that the increased uncertainty in the international arena created by the end of the Cold War has meant that small states find themselves in a unique position to maximise their manoeuvrability, especially in regard to the great powers and thus maximise their influence and offset the constraints they traditionally faced[79]. Since "the position and relative security of any weak state must be gauged in terms of the specific international system in which it is operating" this could be seen to be of importance[80]. However such power is by its nature derivative not intrinsic and so the basic conditions that constrain small state behaviour are still seen to exist despite the possibilities presented by these changes. Other theorists maintain that changing perceptions of security and threat render small state theories increasingly obsolete. In the nuclear age for example the threat of conventional attack has been greatly diluted and thus the constraints placed on small states due to their inability to adequately provide for their own security would therefore no longer be of significance[81]. However as established previously, small states are often characterised by a wider perception of threat that takes into account their economically precarious position and thus changes of this nature would seem to do little to assuage the security concerns of small states.

The debate within small state theories as to whether small states are more likely to be passive or active in their foreign policy initiatives has also come under criticism. Not only can small states be seen to exhibit active policy in some areas whilst remaining passive in others but critics point to the effect that national style or character can have upon how foreign policy is handled as well as leadership differences[82]. Handel goes

further in stressing the importance of not misconstruing small state behaviour-"because weak states lack the strength to sanction and reward, fewer viable policy options may be open to them but this condition is not the same thing as passivity"[83]. Claims that small states exhibit a greater moral slant in their foreign policy have also been the target of criticism. The assumption that by reason of their very smallness they are somehow morally superior some believe is difficult to prove. "There seems little evidence that the political initiatives of small states, however constrained, are characterised by a greater delicacy of scruple, or perceptibly more prudence, than those of greater neighbours"[84]. Evidence of involvement in international organisations is in itself not enough to prove a moralistic stance as the benefits of such involvement for small states have already been ascertained. Thus the selflessness one could read into this participation is doubtful. Similarly questionable is the assumption that small states are more peace-loving than their larger counterparts. Their tendency to avoid conflict could be largely in part due to military shortfalls and the costs involved rather than due to moral considerations[85]. There are however recorded incidents of small states aggressing against other small states indicating there is not necessarily any correlation between small size, relative power and aggression[86].

Other criticisms of small state theories are broader in nature concentrating on the very limitations of the model itself. The behaviour of small states, and in fact of any state, theorists such as Vital maintain is modified by many factors such as the level of economic and social development, the chance effects of geographical proximity to areas of conflict, their importance between and to great powers, the nature of their environment and the cohesion of the population[87]. Thakur claims in small state theories there is "not enough incorporation of the size factor into a dynamic theoretical model which integrates different explanatory variables with precise weighting's and specified relationships"[88]. As such he believes small state theories of foreign policy have by nature difficulty coping with difference and diversity. Small state theories are criticised for not taking into account other variables or levels of analysis. "Although for the purpose of study and analysis it is desirable to isolate and to examine individually each of the influences on foreign policy-making, none in practice operates in isolation from any other"[89]. East, Salmore and Hermann stress the need to take into account other theoretical perspectives as it is aspects such as the regime and the perceptions of the individuals involved which mediate the relationship between national attributes and foreign policy behaviour[90]. It is necessary therefore to recognise the interaction between variables and how these affect the relationship between the perspective under study and foreign policy behaviour.

Extending small state theories

These criticisms would suggest that small state theories need to be extended to include variables from other perspectives, if they are to remain a valid tool in the study of foreign policy. It would be necessary therefore to adopt a model which, whilst maintaining the focus of analysis on the capacity of a state to act, acknowledges the variables which mediate the relationship between this and foreign policy behaviour. Such an approach would examine the impact of mediating or contextual variables, such as the properties of the international system, aspects of the regime, personal characteristics of political leaders, and historical, cultural and geographical perspectives upon the capacity to act. As such it would introduce variables from other perspectives and acknowledge how these may interact with, and hence alter, the capacity to act, and subsequent foreign policy behaviour exhibited.

The question to be addressed therefore is the relevance of continuing to apply traditional small state theories to the study of New Zealand foreign policy. To do so in the context of this study will enable the assumptions of the model to be tested as well as an assessment of the validity of the alternative approach, aimed at meeting the criticisms levelled at traditional small state theories. To take into account the criticisms based on the changing international environment it shall be necessary to make the study broad in its time frame to ascertain if, as critics claim, over time the model has become increasingly obsolete. New Zealand as the small state to be utilised in this study is also well positioned in that, although maintaining close links with Europe and the rest of the Western world, geographically the distance is great thus the usefulness of applying small state models to more diverse geographic areas can also be tested. As New Zealand appears to meet the characteristics small state theories prescribe an examination over time of how well their predictions can be seen to correspond to its foreign policy behaviour will help to provide a clear indication of their continued viability and usefulness.

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CHAPTER TWO:
NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY AND SMALL STATE THEORIES 1944-1954

World War Two was for New Zealand an important turning point both with regards to threat perception and the formulation of its foreign policy. It is necessary therefore to begin an examination of this ten year period by outlining the unique position it found itself in at the beginning of 1944. Although exhibiting a budding independence in foreign affairs New Zealand was up until this point a loyal member of the British Commonwealth and as such had little problem reconciling its foreign policy with that of Britain. Not only did it still regard itself as essentially a European country due to racial, political and cultural traditions but "New Zealand's independence of action in foreign policy was necessarily restricted by defence commitments and trade arrangements with Britain"[1]. It had been during the war, and continued to be, Britain's loyal ally enjoying almost exclusive economic, political and defence links. This continuing identification and the strong ties it fostered manifested itself in a preoccupation with events in Europe and the view that any threat to the United Kingdom would be seen as a threat to "the centre, focus, and force of the British Commonwealth of Nations"[2]. The Commonwealth represented its primary and most accepted means of asserting its own national interests and as such New Zealand's loyalty was seen " less as a mere surrender of judgement to British leadership than as an attempt to win some influence in imperial affairs"[3]. This strong involvement was however a double edged sword as despite its relatively small security needs her Commonwealth involvement and loyalty meant that a wider strategic outlook and broader sense of interdependence was evident than one would expect of a country New Zealand's size[4]. New Zealand lacked the resources to adequately assess world events and to formulate or carry out foreign policy on such a scale and so was dependent upon Britain for intelligence as well as for the forum the Commonwealth provided which enabled its voice, albeit small, to be heard.

In the late thirties and early forties however evidence of a growing independence had begun to emerge. In 1936 for example a series of decisions were made with their underlying basis being a firm adherence to the principles of the League of Nations but which did nonetheless express views at variance with the United Kingdom[5]. New Zealand, which had grown accustomed to having its voice in international affairs heard through its Commonwealth role, began through the League of Nations to undergo "a reluctant rite of passage into the community of independent states"[6]. It "began increasingly to assume the responsibility of assessing for itself the nature of its vital

interests and of pursuing them even if at some cost to the smooth conduct of the relationship with Britain"[7]. However this emerging independence should not be over-rated. New Zealand still concentrated on Europe as the centre of both its trading and defence arrangements and as such was unwilling to adopt policies that expressed views at any great variance with those of Great Britain. "Old loyalties persisted and policy seldom, or with any degree of comfort, ran counter openly to the United Kingdom"[8].

However an increasing awareness of the need to develop a more independent outlook did in 1943 manifest itself in the formation of the Ministry of External Affairs. This department replaced the Imperial Affairs Section of the Prime Ministers Department and was charged with "assessing international developments from a New Zealand point of view and of working out policies which took full account of such developments, as well as of the country's own requirements and outlook"[9].New diplomatic missions were also established at this time in Washington, Ottawa, Canberra and Moscow. These missions and the establishment of a separate department to deal with foreign affairs was primarily the result of a clear shift in threat perception undergone as a result of its experiences during World War Two.

The break down of the Commonwealth security system during the war and Britain's consequent inability to provide New Zealand with protection had left it feeling particularly vulnerable and isolated in the Pacific. The fear of Japan dominated its thinking as, until American intervention, the Japanese had advanced successfully through the Pacific. The attack at Pearl Harbour and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, followed by the fall of Singapore made it evident that the expansionist Asian Empire could not be stopped by the Royal Navy alone. America moved into the vacuum created by Britain's inadequacy but for both Australia and New Zealand this did not abate the growing sense of unease as to the Japanese[10]. Thus New Zealand was forced to recognise the risks of exclusive dependence on the United Kingdom as well as acknowledging for the first time its fallibility. The war also highlighted the inadequacy of its administration's arrangements as regards communication, overseas representation, protection of its interests and the need to prepare for post-war settlements[11]. It also forced New Zealand to face the realities of its situation and corresponding patterns of thought and planning. Its vulnerability as a small nation in the post-war world was evident and that, standing alone, New Zealand lacked the resources to either "defend herself from invasion or keep open trade routes for economical survival"[12]. An increasing element of Pacific-consciousness also began to emerge. Thus "tension was produced by the pull between old habits of thought and emotion and the necessities imposed by geography and the present state of world

affairs"[13]. Evidently New Zealand could no longer rely solely upon the United Kingdom for its defence arrangements and thus at the beginning of this period it was casting about for alternatives.

World War Two still clearly dominated the perception of threat at the outset of this period thus New Zealand's quest for security was seen primarily in terms of defence and its foreign policy reflected this. The weaknesses in its existing system of defence had been made clear therefore the emphasis was on strengthening its defensive position. Little or no emphasis was placed on other aspects of security such as stability in trade, an area which small state theorists highlight as being particularly vulnerable to external influence. New Zealand during the war had experienced a trade relationship with Britain which provided a guaranteed market for its goods and there was no sign of this arrangement changing in the near future. Thus it was defensive concerns that New Zealand's foreign policy was set to address at the beginning of this period.

But to what extent do traditional small state theories aid in an understanding of the foreign policies New Zealand followed in this period? Small state theories acknowledge the inability of most small states to adequately provide for their own security, due to resource limitations, and cite other methods commonly utilised. Security through alliances or associations with more able states is one such tool, as is involvement in international organisations and an adherence to and support for international laws. Through such methods small states are able to lower the costs involved in providing for their defence thus are able to achieve a total expenditure that would normally exceed its means. Such tools or tactics do however exact costs which can erode a states autonomy. By examining the foreign policy initiatives New Zealand adopted during this period for evidence of such tactics, or the costs which may incur as a result of them, a conclusion can be drawn as to whether small state theories alone provide a useful model.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Due to the significance that small state theories attribute to international organisations as a means by which such states are able to exert influence, they are an important starting point in an examination of the foreign policy initiatives adopted by New Zealand in this period. As previously established small state theories highlight the potential benefits international laws and organisations offer. They act as tools which enable states with limited resources the opportunity to exert influence and pursue their national interests in the international arena. Within these frameworks small states can

build coalitions and thus maximise their influence. International laws also provide defence against intervention that a small state may not be able to ensure for itself.

Considering New Zealand's already established history of espousing the principles of collective security the United Nations appeared, at the beginning of 1944, to be an obvious tool to help alleviate its security concerns. In 1944 Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, claimed: "Peace can only be maintained by a world organisation, on the basis of world security"[14]. He went further to say that the idea of regional security was in itself a mirage. Considering its position as a small country with a global market, distant cultural roots and wide security interests a lively self-interest in the stability of the world order seemed the most logical means of protecting interests of this magnitude and thus the United Nations the most significant forum[15]. For a small state the mechanisms of collective security also offered a potentially cost efficient means of having its voice heard and influence felt, as New Zealand's involvement in the League of Nations and the Commonwealth had proved. It's active involvement from the outset in the planning and formation of what was to become the United Nations appeared to be in recognition of these benefits but a closer examination of the actors involved and the initiatives embarked upon is necessary to ascertain the motivation behind the foreign policy.

Discussions as to the drafting of the United Nations Charter began at Dumbarton Oaks in April of 1945 but only the four major allies were present: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. New Zealand had already voiced its concern over the lack of more general consultation through the Canberra Pact which it had signed with Australia. Article 14 of this agreement concerned itself with the establishment of an international organisation, with the desire for Australian and New Zealand involvement stressed[16]. However upon closer examination it is clear the Canberra Pact was an Australian initiative and that New Zealand's involvement was reluctant. "The New Zealander's had envisaged merely an exchange of opinions, noted down in an agreed record of proceedings: they doubted the wisdom and the constitutional propriety of negotiating a formal treaty"[17]. Although clearly concerned about the nature of the Charter being drawn up it insisted that the Australian proposals be either toned down in places or parts dropped before they would sign the Pact. Its commitment was further weakened by the steps taken to placate allies it believed to feel slighted by the content of the Pact.

Once more inclusive talks did commence in San Francisco in 1945 New Zealand soon made its voice heard. It vigorously advocated the development of a system of global

security untrammelled by great power veto and argued strenuously for the rights of small nations[18]. Unified resistance by the great powers meant it was unable to obtain significant modifications however at San Francisco "the New Zealand delegation played a useful role quite disproportionate to the country's size, or indeed to its previous involvement on the international scene"[19]. It persevered in attempts to make the United Nations an effective means of ensuring collective security and condemned aspects it believed to be harmful to the purposes of the organisation itself. Nor did New Zealand at the San Francisco Conference allow traditional ties to interfere with the principles of the Charter. The leading role it took in drafting provisions which set up a trusteeship system for dependent territories, with the ultimate aim of self-government or independence, was done despite the potential embarrassment this may have incurred for the United Kingdom, itself still a major colonial power[20]. However the significance of Australia's partnership in these negotiations must not be overlooked. Many of the amendments that New Zealand fought to achieve were those that had been formulated by the Australians at the Canberra Conference and were often presented as multilateral initiatives. For example the attempts made to prevent the provision of a great power veto was one such initiative brought not by New Zealand alone but by many of the small countries involved in the Conference. It was also in partnership with Australia that New Zealand made proposals to strengthen the human rights provisions of the Charter. On the issue of trusteeship although its representative was the Chairman of the Committee it was Evatt of Australia who was "the principal mover and shaker in its meetings"[21]. Thus the emphasis accorded New Zealand's active role should be somewhat reserved and "it must be emphasised again that the effectiveness of its diplomacy was greatly enhanced by its close collaboration with Australia, from which it differed on no significant issue"[22].

New Zealand was not unaware of the central defects the final Charter contained and the corresponding impact this would have upon the efficient operation of the organisation. By 1946 these problems were becoming evident. The lines of division between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union were becoming clearer and were threatening to render the organisation powerless, much to New Zealand's dismay. Thus by 1948 its expectations of the United Nations were more modest. Fraser reported however that: "It must be accepted with its achievements and its failures, its opportunities and its costs, or we must isolate ourselves from one of the main currents of international life"[23]. New Zealand continued therefore to push for amendments that would render it more effective and sought to demonstrate confidence in the organisation by giving it responsibilities. One such initiative was the proposal that the United Nations be vested with sovereignty over the Italian colonies but this proposal

was rejected[24]. The rejection of this proposal was consistent with the fate of many proposals during this time and was evidence of the central flaw in the Charter created by the great power veto. Multilateral initiatives such as the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution of 1950 were evidence that New Zealand was not alone in this period in its realisation of the inadequacies of the United Nations and so was not alone in its attempts to bring about amendments, despite the lack of success accorded such endeavours[25].

New Zealand continued to support the United Nations and in so doing accepted responsibilities in areas beyond its immediate concern. The response to the Korean War for example was in line with United Nations requests and embarked upon despite initial reluctance. Formally to comply with United Nations requests for involvement New Zealand was forced to change its defence focus from the Middle East, an area it still considered to be a vital security concern. It was argued that it was necessary to demonstrate its commitment to the troubled organisation. However upon examination it is evident that New Zealand's decision to commit to the Korean conflict involved considerations that had little to do with the United Nations. The request for involvement, being an American lead initiative, presented it with a difficult diplomatic situation in its wish to please both the United Kingdom which was hesitant and the United States which it was attempting to commit to the South Pacific area. The British position, shaped by its vested interests in Hong Kong and the fear of renewed civil war in China, was such that it was hesitant to adopt a policy as militantly anti-China as the United States advocated[26]. New Zealand was not prepared to move independently of Britain out of loyalty as well as its own fears of a larger war developing, yet was also aware of the advantages that such a commitment would garner in terms of establishing itself as a useful American ally. The Australians had seized upon this opportunity and announced their commitment almost immediately thus increasing the pressure on New Zealand to bring its policy back in line with its primary partner on South Pacific issues. Eventually the matter was resolved when the British and Americans came to their own agreement whereupon New Zealand felt less hesitant in announcing its support of the Americans. Whereas Australia "perceived an unusual constellation of circumstances and took firm and prompt action to seize the initiative" New Zealand remained reluctant to adopt a policy contrary to its traditional ally despite the clear benefits that the situation presented[27]. Therefore although its decision to send troops to Korea appeared to be in line with its commitment to the United Nations the final decision had little to do with the organisation.

Before becoming involved in the Indo-China crisis New Zealand also sought United Nations endorsement of the American call for united action. However this initiative was motivated by reasons unconnected to the organisation itself. Again it was attempting to stall making a commitment as it not only shared British concerns as to American intentions but was reluctant to become involved in the wider Asian-Pacific region. The Australian's, aware of their vulnerability in that they lay "on the natural line of Communist advance through Southeast Asia" were quick to contribute[28]. Thus New Zealand's hesitancy to answer the American call for action was again potentially jeopardising its bargaining position vis-à-vis the possibility of a Pacific Treaty with the Americans, where the Australians had been seen to take the initiative. The New Zealand government found itself "caught between the wish for security tempered by caution about involvement and the wish to gain a United States commitment without angering the British"[29]. The achievement of a settlement at Geneva ruling out direct intervention made it possible for the British and Americans to move forward jointly with the organisation of collective defence in the region. New Zealand did therefore commit itself to sending troops to South-east Asia but not out of a sense of duty to the United Nations. Despite its concerns as to involvement in Asia it capitulated under pressure, both direct and indirect, applied by the United States and Australia. However New Zealand by jockeying between its two major allies was successful in avoiding a formal commitment until a resolution was reached between the two, evidence of the potential manoeuvrability afforded smaller states.

New Zealand's commitment to the United Nations and its stance on regional security systems began to alter as the potential it had envisaged for the United Nations at San Francisco became increasingly unlikely to eventuate. Where four years early it had fought to have anti-regionalism included in the Charter, in 1949 it acknowledged that regional arrangements such as the Atlantic Pact were essential in certain circumstances and justifiable as long as they did not represent a threat to any peace-loving state or an excuse for non-participation in the United Nations[30]. Whereas Australia, who in its involvement in the drafting of Chapter 8 of the Charter, had acknowledged the need for regional arrangements to ensure security and had envisaged such an arrangement in the Pacific, New Zealand was hesitant to do so. It was not until both its major allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) of 1949 that it was prepared to announce its acceptance of such arrangements and voiced its interest in a similar arrangement for the South Pacific. Yet again New Zealand's foreign policy direction demonstrated a lack of real initiative in that it was responding to the foreign policy moves of those significant to it.

Throughout this period therefore there appears a continuity to New Zealand's record of conscientious commitment to the principles of collective security that would seem to validate small state theorists claims as to the advantages they offer. As the theoretical literature on small states established, this commitment seemed to be motivated both by principle and pragmatism. "Like other small states, there was a transparency to New Zealand's concern to see state behaviour adhere to the rules and principles of conduct prescribed by the United Nations Charter"[31]. Although faced with an organisation rendered ineffective by the great power veto, the United Nations still represented a cost efficient means by which a small state such as New Zealand could exert its influence on a wider scale and disproportionate to the actual leverage it possessed. Its attempts to strengthen the United Nations and the protection it was able to offer a state under threat were therefore consistent with its position as a small state.

The Australian influence on New Zealand's policy as regards collective security cannot be overlooked however. It was essentially Australian proposals that it fought to include in the United Nations Charter and this was often done in partnership with, or under Australian leadership as well in concert with other small states. The hesitancy it exhibited in becoming involved in both the Korean War and the Indo-china crisis is evidence of its support for the United Nations being dependent upon its agenda as regards America and Britain. Further, once NATO was signed, New Zealand was prepared to move its emphasis from the United Nations to the development of regional arrangements. It seems therefore that in this ten year period its level of commitment to the United Nations was dependent upon factors beyond those relating to size. The wishes of its allies, its post-World War Two insecurities and international trends were all factors in the formulation of New Zealand's foreign policy where the United Nations was concerned.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

The Commonwealth at the beginning of this period offered New Zealand an alliance of the nature small state theorists contend provide weak states with the ability to provide for their security whilst offsetting the costs incurred. Despite the benefits of these alliances or associations small state theories emphasis the possible negative aspects such as the commitment that may be required to conflicts beyond a small states regional area of concern and the defence planning involved that may prove inappropriate to its needs. The costs involved, whilst initially appearing to lessen in alliance, may in terms of the commitment required and the loss of autonomy that can result, prove to be great. To ascertain whether New Zealand experienced such costs in

its involvement in the Commonwealth an examination of the course of events and the commitments expected of it must be made.

The Commonwealth had in the past, and still did offer New Zealand an already established and well-tried means of voicing its security concerns as well as providing actual security arrangements, despite the weaknesses that had become evident. Prior to World War Two the Commonwealth represented New Zealand's primary means of providing for its security and all its forces were equipped and trained in a manner consistent with the rest of the Commonwealth. During the war the Commonwealth connection gained it a seat on the Pacific War Council and it was from Britain that it received much of its intelligence. Despite its involvement in the League of Nations New Zealand "upheld the view that in foreign affairs the Empire should be regarded as a unit and that ideally, it should speak with one voice"[32]. In the post-war world of clear divisions between east and west and super power domination the Commonwealth, and Britain, offered New Zealand influence indirectly which it could not hope to attain standing alone. Also implicit in the arrangement were assurances of protection should its security be threatened. However by 1944 it was clear the Commonwealth security system had broken down and "in a situation where Britain herself was so dependent on the United States for achieving her own security and prosperity goals, New Zealand could hardly look to Britain as in the pre-war days as virtually the sole guarantor of her security and prosperity"[33]. A lack of Commonwealth solidarity in Pacific matters was also evident yet as the flaws in the United Nations emerged it was faced with little other option than to continue to develop its defence policy within the British Commonwealth framework. "The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff then, while paying court to the possibility of some future new world-wide system under the United Nations, thought primarily in traditional terms of working through 'Imperial Defence'..."[34]. The security arrangements New Zealand experienced through membership in the Commonwealth were however consistent it believed with the United Nations Charter and thus did not represent any breach in its commitment to the organisation.

Thus at the beginning of this period old loyalties were seen to persist and New Zealand foreign policy continued to be shaped by its Commonwealth membership. It was reluctant to accept any international involvement in an individual capacity and thus often participated as a member of the British Empire. It's role in the occupation of Japan was the first of such commitments in this period made through Commonwealth channels which whilst incurring some costs was primarily embarked upon out of self-interest. Not only was it seen to be both important to the 'team' and diplomatically

advantageous but due to the fears fostered during the war New Zealand had a very real interest in having its voice and presence felt in Japan[35]. Thus through the Commonwealth it was able to exert influence.

New Zealand's continuing commitment to the defence of the Middle East was also due to Commonwealth affiliations even though both during and after World War Two the Pacific area was clearly far more significant to New Zealand's defence than it had previously been. As the Cold War developed and the fear of Communism grew, its continuing preoccupation with events in Europe was evident. It continued to identify with Britain in assessing international developments and its security commitments reflected this Euro-centric bias. It had a standing force in the Middle East and as part of the Commonwealth it supported the Colombo Plan of 1950 which was designed to halt the spread of communism by improving living standards[36]. This deployment represented the bulk of New Zealand's scant defence forces and thus left its ability to undertake commitment elsewhere limited. The reluctance it exhibited in contributing to the United Nations force in Korea was in part due to its unwillingness to withdraw this deployment which it believed to be an essential Commonwealth commitment. This was despite the fact that Britain had since 1946 reduced its responsibilities abroad and was encouraging the Dominions to take responsibility for their own defence. Clearly New Zealand still perceived the defence of Britain and the Commonwealth to be essential to its own security thus the commitment to the Middle East was undertaken willingly. This posting in the Middle East continued throughout the period and was only withdrawn as a result of the Korean War once British approval was secured. Despite this withdrawal New Zealand continued to be committed to the region pledging in 1951 to send 35,000 troops to the Middle East should a major war break out[37].

Despite early reluctance due to its commitment in the Middle East New Zealand's contribution to the Korean War was also within a Commonwealth framework and, as established, British approval was secured before any deployment was made. Although sympathetic to the British position advocating conciliatory measures towards China, the potential for divergence between Britain and New Zealand on this issue existed. Earlier it had been at odds with the United Kingdom over the recognition of China within which Britain had major investments. "New Zealand's refusal to recognise at this time linked it to the newly elected conservative government in Australia, to the United States and to the anti-Communist regimes in Asia"[38]. However New Zealand remained wary of supporting the more forceful American approach to the conflict. As established, this divergence was reconciled not through any initiative adopted by New Zealand rather it was solved when an Anglo-American compromise was reached. This

prevented it from having to separate itself publicly from the Commonwealth whilst enabling it to remain in favour with both Australia and America with whom it was involved in delicate negotiations over the Pacific question. However the cost thus incurred was the removal of New Zealand's troops from the Middle East, an area it was reluctant to leave, and its embroilment in the Asian region something it had been keen to avoid.

The war in Indo-China proved similarly difficult for New Zealand diplomatically. For reasons of its own as well as its Commonwealth ties it again hesitated to become involved when the American call for intervention was made. New Zealand found itself caught between the desire to establish itself as a valuable American ally and the wish to maintain a position consistent with that of the British. However there is clear evidence of self-interest in its desire to avoid commitment that went beyond mere loyalty to the Commonwealth. New Zealand had long voiced its concerns as regards involvement in the wider Asian Pacific region and thus its reluctance due to supposed Commonwealth allegiance must be queried especially timed as it was just after the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty which excluded Britain.

However all was not entirely well as early cracks in New Zealand's relationship with the Commonwealth did develop and there is evidence of careful management of the association throughout. The Canberra Pact signed between New Zealand and Australia in 1944 displeased Britain as it felt its voice alone at the Dumbarton Oaks talks on post-war arrangements was adequate to voice the concerns of the two Dominions. The British considered the Pact to be a "deplorable monument of egregious amateurism in international affairs" and felt slighted by references to the question of trusteeship in the Pacific which was again brought up at the 1945 Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting[39]. New Zealand had wanted a united position from the Commonwealth on the subject but acknowledging this was not a likelihood, Fraser announced that on this issue it would reserve the right to its own opinion [40].The impact of the Canberra Pact was not as harmful to the Commonwealth relationship as some feared in that openly this disagreement was afforded little attention and New Zealand was quick to respond to Britain's concerns by stressing that it was not directed at any one country and that the purpose of it would be defeated if Britain believed this to be so[41]. If one examines the dominance of Australia in the formation of the Pact and New Zealand's hesitancy in formalising it, it is clear that the initiative was an Australian one rather than a joint arrangement. In its attempts to reassure all existing and potential partners as to its intentions there appears further evidence of the lack of real commitment.

The negotiation and signing of the ANZUS Treaty also proved to be a stress on the Commonwealth relationship. Although New Zealand did so with British consultation and in the belief that it would free itself through such a Treaty to play a full part in Commonwealth defence the British were not satisfied[42]. New Zealand envisaged a pattern such as had been evident in World War Two whereby the United States would defend the Pacific leaving it free to fight with Britain in the Middle East and remain loyal to other Commonwealth commitments. Britain however wished to be a signatory as it felt its strong interests in the Pacific entitled it to a place, especially in view of the assumed Commonwealth commitment to the defence of Australia and New Zealand[43]. The Americans were nevertheless anti British inclusion for fear the pact would become too enlarged and both the Australians and the New Zealanders were reluctant to push for British involvement. However at the negotiations New Zealand, whilst aware of the advantages of an American guarantee in the Pacific, clearly demonstrated a limited interest in a treaty claiming a "presidential declaration, preferably with Congressional approval" would have been acceptable[44]. It was not only wary of wider commitments in the area but "the prospect of the United States becoming more important and the British less so in New Zealand's affairs was not one that either public opinion or policy-makers welcomed"[45]. Whereas the Australian's perceived the opportunity presented by the Korean War, and the corresponding change in the American focus on Pacific issues as shall be discussed further, and seized the initiative New Zealand was reluctant to do so. It "found it more difficult than Australia to contemplate a Pacific security arrangement which did not include Britain"[46]. The resulting ANZUS Treaty therefore represents New Zealand's eventual capitulation to Australian and American desires rather than an initiative adopted by it. Thus it was tied into a treaty which opened it to charges of disloyalty to the Commonwealth, which were not reconciled until the signing of SEATO, the implications of which shall be discussed.

Throughout this period therefore the Commonwealth offered New Zealand the advantages small state theories associate with such alliances. It achieved within its boundaries the means to alleviate some of its security concerns through the Commonwealth commitment to defend its territory and the training of its troops and supply of equipment. Although aware of the weaknesses of the Commonwealth as a result of World War Two it still presented New Zealand with a cost efficient means of providing for its defence particularly in the light of the obvious failures of the United Nations. At times the alliance required careful management when its foreign policy direction diverged from that of Britain's but these were often concluded with little or no real consequences being felt. As regards the costs associated with such alliances New Zealand was involved in several conflicts due to Commonwealth initiatives.

However on closer examination there were often benefits gained from these commitments that would otherwise not have been achieved or ulterior motives behind its desire to have Commonwealth involvement secured. Thus the real cost to New Zealand of its involvement in the Commonwealth does not appear high. Its autonomy was not impinged upon significantly by the alliance, as the negotiation of ANZUS proved, while it felt free to cite the Commonwealth as an excuse not to participate, or to stall a decision, when it suited. By examining the wider international political environment, the position Britain was in and the emerging East-West divide the manuoeverablity and leverage New Zealand was seen to achieve in this period can be explained in a way small state theories alone fail to do.

REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Small states, due to the resource limitations they face, often tend to have a narrow focus in their foreign policy initiatives. This, according to theorists, enables them to concentrate their scarce resources on the areas of greatest concern and thus maximise their effectiveness. Within this narrow focus initiatives embarked upon are often multilateral or co-operative to offset the constraints faced individually. Evidence of careful management of foreign policy to minimise risks and avoid angering or alienating important allies is also a characteristic attributed to small states which act to reduce the impact of policy failure. Small states therefore often utilise certain tools which carry with them less in the way of costs and have a narrow foreign policy focus which enables a concentration of resources on the areas of most concern. New Zealand due to its historical ties and through the Commonwealth connection had previously experienced a wide foreign policy focus. However World War Two had clearly exhibited the necessity for it to become more aware of the geographical realities of its position. Thus an examination must be made of the regional initiatives adopted by New Zealand in this period for evidence of a narrowing of focus as well as the utilisation of the tools small state theorists believe characterise such states.

It was through a sense of necessity that, despite New Zealand's continuing suspicion of regional arrangements, it began to acknowledge their place in the post-war environment and even seek out involvement during this ten year period. The United Nations which had for New Zealand held such promise was, due to the excessive authority conferred on the great powers, fatally flawed and so even from the outset an element of uncertainty as regards its operation was introduced. It was clear that the two hostile camps of the post-war world were making universality impossible and hobbling the United Nations functions. "For small states such as New Zealand, these conditions inhibited the scope for manoeuvre and coalition in the United Nations

through ideological and political polarisation's increasingly embedded within competing alliance and security complexes"[47]. By 1949, in accepting the North Atlantic Treaty, it acknowledged the necessity of establishing for defence separate and limited systems of collective security as long as they were seen to be consistent with United Nations principles. Thus once a precedent was set by its allies it was prepared to accept, and even seek out regional arrangements, a move that represented a considerable shift in its policy and which was only adopted once the international trend had been established.

Its realisation of the increasing necessity for regional security arrangements was further enforced by the breakdown of the Commonwealth defence system as already outlined and the vacuum this left in the Pacific. New Zealand due to the events of World War Two with particular reference to the initial success of the Japanese advance, the attack on Pearl Harbour and the inadequacy of the British Navy was slowly developing a 'Pacific-consciousness'[48]. American initiatives to win Japan as an ally in the emerging Cold War through negotiating a 'peace of reconciliation' did nothing to allay its fears of a resurgent Japan and fell far short of the repressive treaty it was advocating[49]. New Zealand had been forced into acknowledging the geographical realities of its position and the problems created by its isolation. Its focus therefore turned to the waters immediately surrounding it and the wider South Pacific area. Little thought was given within this to the individual Pacific Islands rather it was the vulnerability New Zealand experienced due to its isolation and distance from any of its major allies. Australia therefore became an important focus as did the maintenance of a great power presence in the South Pacific. Attempts to provide for its security by economically strengthening or helping to maintain the political stability of the small states in the region was not considered at the time although such a policy was readily adopted in Eastern Europe to halt the spread of Communism. These fears therefore dominated New Zealand's post-war defence thinking and it became evident that they necessitated a rethink of its defence planning.

The desire increasingly to have its voice heard also began pushing New Zealand in the direction of regional arrangements. During the war New Zealand had pressed, primarily through the Commonwealth, for a right to share in policy-making and fighting in the Pacific. However the Cairo Declaration of 1943 which dealt with post-war arrangements for the Pacific region had been concluded without New Zealand involvement or input[50]. This did not bode well when taken in light of the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks which had also included talks regarding the Pacific and Japan's post-war treatment. New Zealand as a small state was clearly finding it increasingly

difficult to have its voice heard and thus began to look to its immediate neighbour Australia, who was also keenly aware of the need to establish a claim and voice in the future of the Pacific. In 1943 New Zealand had established an embassy in Canberra and discussions as to possible actions began.

The Canberra Pact and Pacific involvement

It was from such diverse influences therefore that New Zealand began, albeit it reluctantly, to develop during this period regional arrangements the first of which was the Canberra Pact signed with Australia. Not only did this represent New Zealand's first approach to regionalism but it was the first published evidence of a new era of 'Pacific-awareness'[51]. The primary motivational factor in getting the talks underway which were to become the precursor to the Pact was concern from both parties over the terms of the Cairo Declaration of 1943. Both New Zealand and Australia were apprehensive over the plans produced as to the disposal of Pacific territories after the war and the proposals for American bases. Both felt that their experience, war efforts and vital interests entitled them to a say in the control and destiny of the South Pacific area and were anxious for a voice in any future discussions at the highest level[52]. In signing the Pact New Zealand and Australia announced their intention to act and speak together internationally and to collaborate in maintaining South Pacific security through the creation of a regional security zone. "The pact was an indication that the two Dominions wished to be less dependent on the views of both Britain and America in the Pacific"[53]. However New Zealand had arrived in Canberra expecting to take part in talks only and was disturbed when presented with a draft of what was to become the Canberra Pact. As established New Zealand questioned the wisdom of such a formal arrangement and sought to make alterations before it would sign out of anxiety as to possible reactions. Clearly whilst aware of its very real concerns in the area it was still hesitant to make a stand that could endanger its traditional security arrangements.

New Zealand's concerns appeared to be justified as the Canberra Pact was met with immediate disapproval both from America and Britain. The Americans regarded it "as an ungrateful and somewhat impudent attempt to exclude America from the South Pacific" whereas the British felt slighted by the lack of faith its Dominions had placed in it as regards negotiating a Charter which addressed their concerns[54]. However the implications and consequences of the Canberra Pact should not be over-rated. The potential clash between such an arrangement and New Zealand's aspirations as regards continued American involvement in the Pacific was evident. New Zealand sought therefore to reassure the Americans by stressing the essential role it saw for America

in security and development aspects in the South-west Pacific and by officially recognising American claims to various Pacific islands. The lack of any real impact also served to placate both Britain and America. When the Potsdam Conference concluded for example the Dominions were presented with a 'fait accompli' as regards post-war Pacific arrangements[55]. New Zealand also actively sought to reassure the British a move Australia was reluctant to adopt. The Canberra Pact therefore, whilst "evidence that Australia in particular intended to take vigorous initiatives in pressing publicly views on post-war settlements without much regard to the susceptibilities of its greatest/closest allies", cannot be construed as representing the same for New Zealand[56]. Its involvement was far more conditional and under clear Australian leadership as were its actions at the San Francisco Conference that followed. Claims that the Canberra Pact represented an increasing national maturity, independence of mind and intention of pursuing policy in the Pacific "intelligible in terms not of subordination to British hesitations and abstractions, but of the strategic needs, enlightened self-interest, and duty to Polynesian peoples of a quite independent power..." perhaps add more weight to the Pact than there was in reality[57]. Similarly New Zealand's involvement in the United Nations, in Korea and in negotiations with America over ANZUS were all either in partnership with Australia or under its leadership as shall be examined thus bringing in to question which if any represented initiatives on New Zealand's behalf as opposed to the following of Australia's lead.

Coupled with the Canberra Pact New Zealand was involved in several other organisations that had as their primary aim the economic and social development of the immediate region. As these were undertaken as a means of creating a stable and secure environment they fall within the category of security arrangements. It came to realise the long-term security advantages of a concern for the welfare of native peoples in the Pacific and Asia and their economic, social and political development as poverty and misery were clear seedbeds of revolution and war[58]. In 1946 New Zealand as a member of the United Nations Council participated in the work of the Children's Fund (UNICEF) and in 1950 was part of the Colombo Plan which was concerned with economic development in South and South East Asia. The South Pacific Commission established in 1947 had a similar intent but was focused exclusively on the Pacific region although it included as signatories the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Such endeavours were not wholly altruistic as for New Zealand they offered a means of providing for a more secure environment that incurred little in the way of actual physical costs or commitments. However upon examination it appears none of these initiatives were by New Zealand's design and clearly represented a following of the policies of its allies or of international trends. Its contribution to the Colombo Plan

for example was through the Commonwealth and was a direct response to fears about the spread of Communism, a concern far removed from the geographical realities of its position. The South Pacific Commission was similar in design and, although closer geographically to New Zealand, it was only embarked upon with both American and British involvement. Thus its actions again may illustrate little more than a desire to follow the policies adopted by its major allies and so the significance of its involvement should not be misconstrued as an active foreign policy initiative.

The Securing of an American Commitment

Initially following the conclusion of World War Two it seemed to New Zealand that the much needed American presence in the Pacific would continue. The United States appetite for bases in the Pacific was very public and "New Zealand joined with Britain and Australia in trying to use the island bases as bargaining counters to get the United States to join in a regional security alliance in the South Pacific"[59]. However as the need for a quick peace settlement with Japan became more pressing America's interest in the South Pacific faded. American anti-regionalism was also an issue especially in an area it believed to lack a common civilisation, community of interest and real trust between its diverse countries[60]. This American reluctance to further its involvement in the Pacific compounded New Zealand's new found sense of insecurity and fear of a resurgent Japan. The United States however were pushing ahead with their negotiations of a peace treaty with Japan which contained none of the restrictions New Zealand favoured. The Americans were willing to acknowledge these fears but would only offer informal, general assurances to allay them. Its problem "accordingly was to persuade the Americans to take precautions against a danger which they rated low and against which protection could not be offered by a United Nations paralysed by the Cold War"[61].

New Zealand saw the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty as a precedent for a similar arrangement in the Pacific and the drive and persistence demonstrated in its demands for security guarantees from America against Japan represented a major diplomatic effort[62]. The growing fear of communism gave both New Zealand and Australia their first opportunity to exert some influence. The United States pushed harder in its efforts to normalise relations between Japan and the West as a means of creating in Japan a bulwark against the spread of communism which with the victory in China seemed a very real threat. New Zealand and Australia began preliminary discussions and sought to agree on an approach to the peace treaty with Japan which would include some degree of an American guarantee in the Pacific. However there were limitations as to the extent of agreement that could be reached between the two on

Pacific security as New Zealand remained anti British exclusion or an agreement that could mean new commitments[63]. Eventually New Zealand capitulated "in the face of the determination of the Australian delegation to achieve a common front" at any negotiations that took place[64]. Thus it was the Australians that persuaded it to develop a joint policy which linked the acceptance of any peace treaty with Japan to a security arrangement with the Americans in the Pacific. But still the Americans were reluctant.

The outbreak of the Korean War was for New Zealand and Australia fortuitous in that it had a two-fold effect on the negotiations. The United States was forced to alter its perceptions as to the area of principal Communist threat and correspondingly upgraded its concern in Asia and the Pacific[65]. Australia's quick response to the American sponsored United Nations request for assistance created goodwill in establishing it as a valuable ally and gave it further leverage with the United States which it was quick to exploit. New Zealand as we have seen was not as quick to offer its support as it remained hesitant of a wider commitment as well as of separating itself from the British position. "In short, a Pacific pact in the particular form of the ANZUS Treaty became for the first time negotiable against the background of, first, American pressure for an early and general peace treaty with Japan, and, secondly, military aid readily and swiftly given by Australia during the Korean War"[66]. In these conditions Australia, with New Zealand, was able therefore to secure a tripartite defence agreement in the form of the ANZUS treaty which met with both of their defence requirements in the Pacific without including commitments of a wider nature in the region. The success afforded this initiative was largely due to factors of an international scale as it was the growing fear of communism that enabled New Zealand, in partnership with Australia, to exercise leverage in a manner small state theories do not account for.

The role New Zealand adopted at the treaty negotiations is important however in establishing its commitment. It remained wary of becoming involved in any commitments through the association that would take it away from those it was already involved in and as established was reluctant to make the arrangement a formal one. Both Australia and America desired more of a commitment and thus New Zealand was seen to capitulate. Therefore while appearing significant in that it was seen to negotiate and sign a treaty without Britain the Australian role as leader and initiator cannot be ignored nor the obvious apprehensions evident in New Zealand's position. As earlier established New Zealand signed the Treaty in the firm belief that this arrangement would free it to discharge its defensive duties as both part of the

Commonwealth and as a member of the United Nations. Thus, although appearing to illustrate a growing Pacific-consciousness and a realistic response to its strategic position, ANZUS did not represent a shift of such magnitude in that New Zealand was still evidently thinking within traditional alliance patterns and defence planning elsewhere.

The South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty(SEATO)

The final evidence of its involvement in regional security arrangements was in the role it took in the drafting of the Manila Treaty of 1954. As a response to fears of the spread of Communism New Zealand joined with the United States, Britain, Australia, France, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines in making a formal commitment to the defence of this area. It had traditionally been hesitant of any involvement in Asia as it was regarded as beyond its immediate area of security concern and this was heightened by Britain's initial reluctance. However as Britain warmed to the idea New Zealand saw it as a way of obtaining a security arrangement that included both the United States and Britain, something it had aimed for since the signing of ANZUS and the subsequent mutterings in Britain about its exclusion. In that it was only with the United States and the United Kingdom that New Zealand would accept involvement in Asia, as well as its concern to placate the British, "New Zealand's membership of the new pact had an undeniable imperialist echo"[67]. New Zealand's involvement in SEATO therefore is again not evidence of a real initiative rather of its desire to follow its allies and maintain favour internationally even though it was as a result burdened with a commitment it had previously been anxious to avoid.

1944-1954: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SMALL STATE?

By examining the events of these ten years and the foreign policy initiatives New Zealand embarked upon can the characteristics that traditional small state theories prescribe and the subsequent effect these are believed to have upon foreign policy decision-making be ascertained? New Zealand clearly showed evidence, between 1944-1954, of the conditions that small state theories identify as characteristic. Not only was it dependent economically upon its trade with Britain, and later others in the global market, but the products it exported were limited in nature. Small state theories highlight the restrictions imposed by New Zealand's small home market which left little room for diversification and opening new markets proved to be a costly and time consuming pursuit. Thus when it came to trade, New Zealand experienced the vulnerability to adverse international trends that small state theories prescribe and as such was wary of unsettling traditional arrangements. The commitment throughout this period to Britain through Commonwealth arrangements and its attempts to allay

Britain's fears as to its continued loyalty despite the costs incurred is evidence of this, particularly when the Commonwealth had exhibited such clear shortfalls in meeting its requirements during World War Two. However due to its recent experiences during World War Two, it was physical security not trade that dominated the foreign policy focus. Small state theories stress economic preoccupation in the foreign policy of such states yet in this period the wider international environment was seen to impact upon New Zealand's perception of threat. Theories that stress the significance of context on foreign policy formulation and the impact of interdependence would therefore explain this anomaly.

With regard to its security arrangements in this ten year period a similar pattern is evident. World War Two had emphasised its inability to physically defend itself and this coupled with the isolation it experienced made its sense of vulnerability even greater. As commonly experienced in small states, New Zealand was faced with limited human and material resources that compounded its inability to defend its own territory. Throughout this period therefore it was involved in a series of external arrangements designed to alleviate this insecurity and provide a cost efficient means of providing for its defence arrangements just as small state theories of foreign policy prescribe. New Zealand's continuing commitment to the British Commonwealth during this period was evidence of this foreign policy strategy as through its involvement it gained a security guarantee as well as training and equipment. Small state theories however maintain that such alliances carry with them costs which act to impede the autonomy of the weaker state in the alliance. Evidence of this is not so clear in New Zealand's Commonwealth security relationship. Admittedly it was through Commonwealth arrangements that it remained committed to defence in the Middle East however as a result of its Euro-centric focus it perceived this area to be a continuing security risk to Britain and thus to itself. The reluctance exhibited during the Korean War to remove these troops, even to an area closer to its own region, is evidence of the willingness to maintain this commitment. Its contribution to both Korea and Indo-China was also through a Commonwealth force and was embarked upon reluctantly. However this was not due to an unwillingness to accept its Commonwealth responsibilities rather it was out of concerns mirrored within the United Kingdom itself. On both occasions New Zealand used the Commonwealth as a means of justifying its hesitation when it had concerns of its own as to involvement. It seems therefore that the Commonwealth incurred for New Zealand little in the way of actual costs and did not act to impinge upon its autonomy. Despite displeasing the United Kingdom over the Canberra Pact and later ANZUS few negative consequences were experienced. Charges of disloyalty were made but no punishment exacted. New

Zealand did however sign SEATO, and in so doing took on wider responsibilities in the Asian Pacific region, as a means of having both of its major allies tied together through one alliance, an endeavour it had been unable to achieve at the ANZUS negotiations.

New Zealand's post-colonial status and its continued close relationship with the United Kingdom did however impact upon its foreign policy in ways small state theories fail to account for. The Commonwealth fostered in it a broader sense of interdependence, resulting in a wider international focus than small state theories predict. Continued post-colonial ties also proved advantageous in rising above the constraints small state theorists base their propositions upon. The Commonwealth forum gave New Zealand a voice internationally whilst the United Kingdom provided it with intelligence information and a guaranteed a market for its produce. This freed it from the problems associated with a lack of adequate information gathering as well as the economic preoccupation that small state theorists propose. Thus factors beyond size, namely New Zealand's historical ties, were instrumental in alleviating the constraints it faced and therefore interacted in the formulation of its foreign policy.

The ANZUS Treaty also represents an alliance of the nature small state theorists believe characterise attempts to achieve security goals. It offered New Zealand the security guarantee it desired in the Pacific without involving it in any wider commitment. The motivation behind the alliance was the position of isolation and vulnerability it found itself in following World War Two. Here the significance of New Zealand's geographical location and large marine territory were clearly evident in the formulation of its foreign policy. Throughout the ANZUS negotiations evidence of its reluctance to anger the British or to become involved in the wider Pacific region appear to validate small state theories as to the management tactics such states utilise. The eventual New Zealand capitulation to both Australian and American wishes as regards British exclusion is clear evidence of the lose of autonomy felt once it entered negotiations as is the commitment that it made to Indo-China under pressure to demonstrate its commitment to the newly signed Treaty. The signing of SEATO, which included its two major alliance partners and in so doing joined the two in their commitment to New Zealand's security, clearly incurred costs that it was unwilling to undertake but that in the circumstances appeared to be justified.

Thus its independence of action was during this period somewhat restricted by defence commitments and trade arrangements, initially with Britain alone and later with the United States, as small state theories predict. New Zealand was obliged through these

alliances to commit its resources, albeit scarce in nature, globally despite the realities of its geographical position and its commitments to both of these powerful allies did on occasion clash. While remaining economically dependent on the United Kingdom, New Zealand was increasingly reliant upon the United States for its physical security. Through-out this period therefore the wish to please both of these allies dominated its foreign policy focus. New Zealand did however utilise this position to its advantage. It was seen to play its two major allies off against each other in its attempts to avoid commitment, as was evident in the Korean conflict as well as the war in Indo-China. Small state theories acknowledge that due to their very nature such states may achieve greater manoeuvrability than their larger counterparts but this is seen to occur only when external conditions permit. For example in securing the American commitment in the Pacific it was able to use the increasing fear of communism to its advantage. To understand the foreign policy adopted in this period therefore it is necessary to introduce variables from other perspectives and levels of analysis.

With regard to the costs that small state theories believe accompany such alliances New Zealand appears to have avoided significant erosion of its autonomy as during this period it signed both the Canberra Pact and ANZUS to Britain's displeasure but with no real consequences. Again therefore it is necessary to examine the wider context to establish how it was able to rise above the consequences traditionally associated with such alliances. In both of these endeavours the leadership role Australia adopted was significant in diffusing the response as were the conditions of the international arena and the emerging Cold War. When New Zealand did incur costs they were often accepted willingly as in the Middle East or were as a trade-off for further benefits as in the signing of SEATO. However when New Zealand acted in partnership with Australia, who acted as an intermediary bearing the brunt of any displeasure its joint actions resulted in, New Zealand was subject to a considerable loss of autonomy as evident in the signing of the Canberra Pact and ANZUS. Thus in its quest for security New Zealand did find itself involved in alliances and associations that impinged upon its autonomy yet was also able to gain some concessions due to external conditions that enabled it to rise above its constraints.

Small state theories highlight the necessity for such states to carefully manage their foreign policy behaviour and decision-making to avoid confrontation thus minimising the risks and costs incurred. Evidence of an awareness of the need for careful diplomacy within New Zealand's foreign policy is clear during this ten year period. From the outset, although seeming to demonstrate increased independence, it was quick to reassure all its existing and potential partners of its intentions. From the

signing of the Canberra Pact to its negotiations with the United States over ANZUS, New Zealand sought to constantly reassure Britain of its loyalty and commitment to the Commonwealth both verbally and through its actions. It hesitated in its signing of the Canberra Pact out of fear of Britain's reaction and the same hesitancy was evident at ANZUS negotiations. Despite an earlier disagreement over the recognition of China New Zealand stalled the announcement of its commitment to the Korean War until the Commonwealth position was solidified, although clearly here an element of self-interest played an important role. At least publicly it was only in relation to the United Nations that the New Zealand government articulated views at variance with the United Kingdom such as over trusteeship arrangements but here again the Australian influence can not be overlooked[68]. Nonetheless New Zealand did in this ten year period participate in two alliances, the Canberra Pact and ANZUS, which did incur the displeasure of Britain although its reluctance to do so was evident in the negotiations of both. As a direct result to the charges of disloyalty to Britain and the Commonwealth that these alliances provoked New Zealand signed SEATO and in so doing took on additional commitments in its attempts to appease the British.

A similar pattern is evident in its relationship with the United States. New Zealand was quick to reassure the Americans as to the intentions outlined in the Canberra Pact and went so far as making important concessions on the issue of Pacific bases in its bid to ease their anxieties. At the Colombo Conference, where discussions over the recognising of Communist China took place, it argued strongly against such a move out of concern that by taking a position contradictory to that of the United States there could be negative implications for their relationship. New Zealand feared that such recognition would antagonise the Americans and increase their determination to strengthen Japan as a bulwark against communism. Over involvement in the Korean War it was faced with a similarly difficult diplomatic situation in its wish to please both the United Kingdom and the United States. It advanced carefully diplomatically until a Commonwealth commitment was approved whereupon it rushed to make an announcement so that it could be seen as ready and willing to support the Americans. New Zealand's contribution was also the second highest proportionately to the United States in a bid to be perceived as a valuable ally.

Therefore New Zealand's foreign policy during this period can be seen to be dominated by the relationships with its two major allies and the careful management involved in maintaining both. New Zealand believed as such that "it must be prepared to pay the price by being willing in its turn to take Britain and American interests into account in formulating its own policy, even where New Zealand interests were not

directly involved"[69]. Any substantial alteration in New Zealand's foreign policy was seen to be contingent upon changes in either of it's major allies and the "natural tendency was therefore to adopt the viewpoint of our protectors"[70]. Thus the system of alliances that New Zealand operated within between 1944-1954, whilst providing for its security, did imposed some behavioural restrictions just as small state theories predict.

The protection offered by international law and the forums its organisations provide are another tool often utilised by small states according to theorists and again New Zealand's record during these ten years tended to follow such a pattern. The continuity evident in its record of conscientious commitment to the principles of collective security and the United Nations itself despite the obvious flaws, is a characteristic small state theorists recognise as representing a handy moral if not actual defence against intervention. In New Zealand's case this involvement began at the outset with a history of active participation within the League of Nations and continued through the forties and fifties when it consistently fought to strengthen the United Nations and demonstrate its confidence in the organisation. New Zealand strongly espoused the cause of collective security and the United Nations, believing it to be "one of the chief channels through which the nations, the great powers, as well as the small, express their foreign policies"[71]. However due to the strong leadership Australia offered New Zealand and the other small states at San Francisco it is difficult to ascertain which if any of the amendments it was seen to support were genuine initiatives on its behalf as opposed to Australian led initiatives. Further evidence of external influence was reflected in the shift towards regional arrangements that occurred during this period. Once the international environment began to change and the acceptance of regional arrangements became more widespread New Zealand also altered its focus.

Other tools and tactics New Zealand utilised during this period in attaining, or in its attempts to attain, its foreign policy goals are seen to correspond with those believed to be peculiar to small states. Due to the lack of resources experienced in many small states the nature, operation and effectiveness of their diplomatic service is necessarily restricted. On the negative side this often results in a narrow focus and a limit in the policy options and means available. However theorists believe this can also prove advantageous in that a concentration of energy on a single issue may be possible where it would not be for a larger state. For New Zealand the constraints its diplomatic service faced were clear. New Zealand still relied upon Britain and the Commonwealth structure for intelligence gathering, as it lacked the man-power to do so efficiently itself, and the diplomatic missions that had been established were by no means

widespread or adequately manned. This impacted upon the tactics New Zealand adopted therefore as they had to be within its limited capacity.

One such tactic New Zealand adopted was to collaborate with others as a relatively cost-efficient means of having its voice heard. The Canberra Pact was a clear example of this as were the coalitions formed within the United Nations to push for the rights of small states. However, as already discussed, both of these measures were afforded little success due to the emerging power blocs of the Cold War and New Zealand's reluctance to upset any of its allies. The use of persuasion and unthreatening rhetoric are further means available to small states which theorists recognise as typical and are evident in the foreign policy of New Zealand in this period. In its attempts to secure a voice in the Pacific it actively emphasised its Pacific identity to establish its credentials as a small nation with legitimate concerns in the area although this was representative of a tactical move rather than as evidence of greater 'Pacific mindedness'[72]. Similarly in its attempts to secure an American commitment in the Pacific, New Zealand's chief tactic initially was the use of rhetoric through which it stressed the "genuine community of interest inherited from history, and nourished by cultural affinity as well as by co-operation in a crisis" [73]. Such rhetoric represented a cheap means by which New Zealand could pursue its diplomatic goals without incurring costs or upsetting any present or future partners. Established forums became the venues from which New Zealand launched such rhetoric and was able to voice its concerns. The United Nations was the primary organ utilised but others such as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings also proved useful.

Involvement in economic or developmental arrangements was another tactic New Zealand utilised in this period as a cost efficient means of providing for its security. Corresponding with its new found awareness of its geographical realities New Zealand embarked upon various measures to secure its environment through developmental and aid programmes. These were primarily established within existing organisations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Canberra Pact and as such the costs were distributed allowing New Zealand to benefit without committing resources beyond its limited means. Again however it must be stressed that none of these organisations were created due to initiatives on New Zealand's behalf and in its involvement it was merely following the actions of its allies.

Another tactic New Zealand was seen to adopt in this period, although more costly, was to establish goodwill through its actions and in so doing attempt to secure its foreign policy goals. This was most clearly evident in the decision to send troops to

Korea. "The crucial determinant in Holland's mind was almost certainly the likely political disadvantages of a failure to support the Anglo-American lead"[74]. The pressure to make such a commitment was further increased by the actions of Australia who were quick to respond to the American call for support as a means of elevating their status as a valuable ally.

New Zealand's involvement in SEATO represented a similar trade-off between the costs incurred and the potential benefits. Although anxious to avoid involvement in Asia, it was aware of the advantages in signing an agreement of which both of its major allies were signatories. In both of these cases New Zealand aware of the lack of leverage it wielded, was willing, to make wider commitments than would otherwise have been desirable to gain political concessions. This behaviour typifies that which is often seen in small states as they lack the resources to more actively pursue their foreign policy goals and so must use what little leverage they are able to obtain. The impetus Australia provided in heightening New Zealand's awareness of the potential for such manoeuvring and the subsequent pressure it applied must however detract from the significance that these actions can be afforded and must lead to a questioning of whether this is therefore evidence of the tactics small state theories prescribe.

To its advantage New Zealand was able to utilise leverage as evident in the securing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. In light of the continuing war in Korea and the escalating fear of Communism New Zealand and Australia were in a position to push for the security requirements they desired in the Pacific. The United States looking to secure a peace treaty with Japan and aware that it needed the signatures of both New Zealand and Australia was willing therefore to accept "a regional security arrangement with the United States as an essential prior condition to their acceptance of any peace treaty"[75]. There is an element of manoeuvrability evident here which small state theorists recognise as a means by which such states can temporarily offset the constraints that they experience. The credit for the diplomatic endeavour undertaken in securing this agreement must however be accorded the Australians who were responsible for seizing the initiative and getting negotiations underway where the New Zealand delegation continued to voice its reluctance. The unique relationship forged with Australia out of shared history and geographical proximity also acted as a buffer between it and its more powerful allies.

A narrow focus in foreign affairs is another common feature brought about by the realities facing small states and elements of this are evident in the policies of this period. New Zealand continued to identify with Britain in assessing international

developments as well as having an economic focus with a narrow, colonial base. Britain was still considered to be its 'window to the world' and its security concerns reflected this Euro-centric bias. This continued identification meant New Zealand was slow to realise the need to switch its strategic interests to the Pacific and its reluctance to do so was evident throughout the ten year period. However through its involvement in the Commonwealth, its historical and economic ties as well as a history of participation in world affairs through international organisations its focus was wider than small state theorists predict. In New Zealand at this time this was manifested in "a wide and rather confusing gap between our security needs and our security interests"[76]. New Zealand was seen therefore to exhibit a wide foreign policy focus and a broad sense of interdependence that appears contrary to small state theories.

Small state theories refer to the possibility of personal influence on policy making as being an issue as foreign policy units may lack the resources or machinery to achieve the institutionalisation evident in larger states. Due to its being modelled on the British system and the accessibility of information through Commonwealth channels as well as the United States, the New Zealand diplomatic service although small was fully developed. Despite this foreign policy was determined by a small group of individuals with almost non-existent public involvement. There is little evidence of any one individual dominating the process however. The change of government that occurred within this period would appear to back this claim as "the National governments emphasis on Commonwealth ties and its anti-communism were different only in degree from those of Labour and the National government wished, like its predecessor, to maintain friendship with the United States"[77].

Within small state theories, as discussed, there is some debate as to whether such states are more likely to be passive or active in their foreign policy initiatives. This debate can be seen reflected in the policy decisions taken by New Zealand in this period as at times it appeared to adopt an active role where in reality it was less so. Its apparently active role in the United Nations for example must be questioned as it was the Australians who put forward and lead the drive for amendments . In its signing of the Canberra Pact and in negotiating ANZUS New Zealand also seemed to actively pursue its policy in the face of great power opposition but again the Australian influence cannot be ignored. It hesitated in taking the initiative over a commitment to the Korean War despite the obvious benefits, which the Australians were quick to perceive and act upon. Its reluctance to commit to the wider Pacific and Asian region was also a consistent feature of the foreign policy of this period born out of an awareness of the constraints it faced rather than out of disinterest.

The debate as to the moral slant of small states is similarly reflected in New Zealand's foreign policy in this period. In practice there seems little evidence to suggest that its foreign policy was devised out of some sense of moral superiority. Involvement in the United Nations offered a forum where its voice could be heard as well as in theory providing for its protection if it were invaded. New Zealand's arguments for magnanimity in peace settlements with Germany and Italy on the grounds that "it felt that effects of the punishment should be such as to promote international peace and security" were soon forgotten when it came time to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan[78]. Similarly in its economic and developmental policies it appears self interest was the deciding factor although "all this interest and activity was in line with the country's humanitarian tradition and attitude"[79].

In conclusion therefore whilst it did experienced the constraints that typify small states during this ten year period its foreign policy did not always exhibited the characteristics small state theories prescribe. In terms of its trade and security arrangements New Zealand was bound through its alliance systems to commitments that stretched its resources and necessitated the need for careful management. However in relation to the benefits received from these alliances the costs were relatively low and as such were not sufficient to impinge upon its independence to act autonomously. Where New Zealand did rise above the constraints small state theories focus upon it is necessary to look at the wider international environment to understand how this was achieved.

In light of the lack of independent initiatives on New Zealand's behalf it is also difficult to ascertain whether its actions in this period can be attributed to theories that are based upon size alone. The direction of most of the policies it adopted were either set by the Australian precedent or can be seen to follow either one or both of its major allies. As such the evidence of careful management that would appear to validate small state claims may be evidence of New Zealand juggling the two relationships in its attempts to please both. At times its actions appear to be more those of a former colony, still unwilling to sever the ties to its motherland and the focus of its foreign policy would seem to support this. Any alliances that took it further from its traditional arrangements were embarked upon reluctantly despite the clear benefits they offered. Therefore small state theories that are utilised in the study of states constrained by limited resources but which are nonetheless independent seem, alone, to be an insufficient model in understanding the foreign policy of New Zealand in this period. An acknowledgment of its ex-colonial status would prove enlightening as would some reference to the international power balance at the time which was an important factor

in New Zealand's foreign policy direction. The difficulty it experienced in juggling its relations with Britain and America was as a direct result of the realisation of the weakened condition of the Commonwealth after the War and America's subsequent emergence as a major player both internationally and in the Pacific. Some attention must also be given to the dominance of Australia in shaping New Zealand's foreign policy in this period as many of the initiatives that appear to validate the application of small state theories were upon examination by Australia's design and under pressure from it to comply. Small state theories do acknowledge the need for such states to form alliances with more powerful states yet this relationship was particularly close and atypical, in that Australian clearly adopt a leadership role. Traditional small state theories alone therefore provide an insufficient model in understanding the foreign policy of New Zealand between 1944-1954. As critics suggest they fail to acknowledge mediating or contextual variables that, by altering the capacity to act, resulted in foreign policy behaviour at times contrary to that small state theories predict.

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CHAPTER THREE:
NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY AND SMALL STATE THEORIES 1984-1994

Although nothing to the extent of the turbulence evident at the conclusion of World War Two, New Zealand was nonetheless faced with a rapidly changing global environment which, as was the case in the earlier period, forced a reassessment of perceived threat and the strategies adopted to counter them. Since at least the 1970's, it had faced a non-specific strategic environment with no readily identifiable direct threat or perception of threat[1]. The 'domino theory' had been discredited. Communism had not spread and the Asia-Pacific region was fairly stable. However the early 1980's were characterised in both Europe and the United States by a surge in anti-nuclear sentiment which was felt the world over. In New Zealand this movement gained support and credibility as the "globally suicidal nature of nuclear weapons was recognised"[2]. It became increasingly evident that threat of invasion in the conventional sense or from a traditional source was unlikely considering New Zealand's geographical isolation and size. Attention therefore turned to the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possible consequences of a nuclear war. "New Zealand's anti-nuclear and nationalist sentiment coincided in the recognition that nuclear war constituted the most significant threat to national security"[3]. These concerns were assimilated into the mainstream of political opinion and manifested in calls to see defence policy reflect specific geographical realities and interests. Increasingly this lead to uneasiness in abdicating responsibility for the nuclear question to its allies as well as increased doubt as to the relevance of traditional concepts of armed deterrence through the alliance system in relation to nuclear threats and dangers.

By the early 1980's therefore New Zealand had not only responded to the global anti-nuclear movement, it was also beginning to question its traditional alliance partnerships and the relevance of these to its security in the nuclear age. The Vietnam War had sown the seeds of this disillusionment. The New Zealand contribution had been reluctantly agreed upon to ensure continued harmony within ANZUS but domestically it had been the cause of much polarisation, as it had elsewhere internationally. The effect was twofold resulting in a significant drop in confidence in the United States led alliance as well a decline in interest "in alliances and in things military in general"[4]. The rise to power of Ronald Reagan in the United States further intensified the anti-nuclear debate as his policy aim was to achieve nuclear superiority by the end of the 1980's and as part of his approach he insisted on sending nuclear

ships into the ports of alliance partners[5]. To a nation already aware of the environmental dangers it faced from nuclear weapons, due to its proximity to the French nuclear testing in the Pacific, this insistence lead to more widespread support for the anti-nuclear movement. Not only were there risks of an accident involving nuclear material occurring in its waters but the obligations imposed by ANZUS began to be perceived as a possible reason for a nuclear attack upon New Zealand and the costs therefore too high. The obligation to accept a United States military presence in the country where there was no evidence that it had anything to do with contingency plans for defending it was increasingly the cause for debate as was the military commitments and the maintenance of forces that in their offensive capabilities appeared unsuitable for its defence[6]. Thus given the government's belief that "the main danger to New Zealand's security was that of global nuclear weapons proliferation and that ANZUS gave little security in relation to this threat, a new strategy was needed"[7].

In its response to the global anti-nuclear movement and the corresponding questioning of the viability of traditional alliance structures in the nuclear age New Zealand appeared at the beginning of this period to be adopting an approach that mirrored international trends yet in its existing alliances it was still subject to the constraints and obligations that small state theories prescribe. Despite its limitations as a small state, calls were being heard to adopt a foreign policy that articulated the unique position of the country and disillusionment with its alliance partners was evident. Globally concerns turned to halting the nuclear arms race while regionally New Zealand sought to adopt a policy that met its interests whilst taking into account its specific geographical location[8]. The necessity of defence planning to deal with low-level incursions and intrusions was beginning to take priority as the lack of any identifiable direct threat or perception of threat made further expenditure appear unnecessary. Thus New Zealand's focus was on its immediate geographical region and the need to maintain stability in the area through regional co-operation and aid.

Economic and trade policy had also begun to take on greater significance as the increasingly interdependent nature of the global economy became more evident. Economic concerns were displacing military power as the main determinant of global order and "threats of trade wars were replacing more familiar armed confrontations"[9]. The trade blocs which were emerging and the protectionist measures they often put in place were proving difficult for a small state to overcome. The relevance of such trends had been illustrated in the 1970's with the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the European Community and from this point New Zealand's foreign policy concerns

were increasingly directed towards trade. In light of such changing priorities therefore the foreign policy initiatives New Zealand adopted in this period need to be examined for evidence of the behaviour and constraints small state theorists believe characterise such states so a conclusion can be drawn as to whether such theories are a useful model in understanding the direction taken. The changes that occurred internationally in this period also make it significant to the study. As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union began to thaw in the late 1980's the bipolar structure that had predominated began to crumble. This impacted upon the existing power balance thus could be seen to alter the conditions within which small states formulate their foreign policy.

NEW ZEALAND'S ANTI-NUCLEAR STANCE

As a result of growing support for the anti-nuclear movement the New Zealand Labour party began the build up to the 1984 election on an anti-nuclear platform. Within the party there had been much debate as to the extent of the policy, whether it should endorse a nuclear ban or withdrawal from ANZUS altogether. A policy of renegotiating the alliance on an anti-nuclear basis was decided upon at the outset of its campaign[10]. Labour's subsequent victory in the election was a clear indication of the widespread support for its anti-nuclear stance. Thus the policy was soon implemented and a strict nuclear-free ban was declared. The United States Secretary of Defence, Schultz, responded by announcing that the policy was incompatible with ANZUS, claiming that the alliance involved an acceptance of global nuclear deterrence, and that the treaty could not be re-negotiated[11]. Events did not however lead to a confrontation on the issue until 1985 when the United States requested that the non-nuclear USS Buchanan be allowed to visit New Zealand. "There is strong supposition that the American's expected the request to be accepted" as Lange had led Schultz to believe that accommodation of such a request was not unlikely[12]. However this was not so and the request was denied. The American response was immediate, as it perceived New Zealand's refusal to be a direct challenge to its policy and held fears of contagion[13]. Intelligence and military ties were severed, diplomatic consultations ended and scheduled joint exercises cancelled. Nonetheless New Zealand maintained its position signing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in August and tabling its anti-nuclear bill in December of 1985.

Small state theories emphasise the need for such states to carefully manage their foreign policy to avoid confrontations, especially with more powerful allies, as the costs incurred may otherwise be high. In its decision to become nuclear-free there was widespread concern, and even threats at the time, as to the costs it would incur.

Immediately following the announcement the Americans did cancel all scheduled joint exercises, personnel exchanges and intelligence sharing but there were clear boundaries set to the 'punishment'. Despite having no "strategic or economic incentive to take special care with New Zealand: it could act decisively and know that it would not suffer any consequences", the areas effected remained within the sphere of military co-operation and threats as to trade sanctions never eventuated[14]. New Zealand's status was formally demoted in 1987 from that of ally to friend however "diplomacy, trade and cultural exchange continued as vigorously as before the dispute"[15]. By 1991 high level official contact had resumed although ANZUS still had not returned to the full tripartite relationship that it had been previously.

However upon examination there is evidence of careful management to reduce the likelihood of costs being incurred as theorists predict, as well as evidence to suggest that the government believed the United States would not react as staunchly as it did. The international climate and the American adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty of Tlateloco for Latin America, lulled the government into believing a pattern had been established ensuring a moderate response[16]. Once the decision was taken and America's disapproval was made clear New Zealand immediately moved to reduce the costs of its actions. From the outset of the dispute New Zealand was quick to emphasise the non-nuclear nature of ANZUS and that, contrary to American claims, it did not require the acceptance of global nuclear deterrence[17]. On this basis it stressed the decision to become nuclear free represented a challenge to nuclear proliferation not to the United States, or any other traditional ally, and that it would continue to meet its ANZUS obligations through non-nuclear conventional means[18]. Lange countered arguments made by the United States that the New Zealand policy contravened their neither confirm nor deny policy stating it would make its own assessment and so would not require a declaration on the part of the Americans[19]. He also emphasised that the policy, whilst being appropriate for New Zealand and its region, was not for export. Claims that nuclear weapons had no relevance to the defence of the region deliberately left room for debate as to their relevance elsewhere as Lange had been warned by his foreign affairs advisers that "he would not be able to advance the cause of disarmament if he challenged the existence of the nuclear deterrent, on which so many countries in the West had pinned their faith"[20].

Attempts at compromise were also made throughout the period to return to full operation of the ANZUS alliance. In 1987 amendments were made to the nuclear free Bill to give blanket clearance to foreign military aircraft where New Zealand was

satisfied that they were not carrying nuclear weapons and an inquiry into allowing nuclear-powered ships to bypass the legislation was undertaken in 1991, "an initiative aimed at improving relations with the United States and, in future, resuming trilateral ANZUS participation"[21]. The Bill itself had also been put on hold while the Minister of Defence undertook negotiations with Schultz, although the signing of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in the interim left little room for manoeuvre[22]. External dimensions and comparisons were also stressed in an attempt to set a precedent for compromise. Attention was focused by New Zealand upon other countries who "although formally aligned to the United States, placed various qualifications, if only declaratory, on their willingness to accept nuclear weapons on visits to their territories, be it land, air or sea"[23]. New Zealand continued therefore "to formulate its position as one concerned solely with the matter of nuclear weapons, not with the alliance as a whole" and attempts to placate the Americans are evident throughout[24].

The consequences of its actions were not however restricted to the sphere of ANZUS as internationally New Zealand was criticised for weakening the Western alliance system and its policy was condemned as unrealistic and disruptive[25]. Both the Australians and the British voiced their disapproval, with the British warning that its ability to uphold New Zealand's position as regards continued access to the European Community had been made more difficult[26]. Although these criticisms soon abated it did experience a lose in leverage with traditional allies as its reliability and consistency were questioned. The lack of international condemnation of the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior was evidence of this. The Americans unwilling to antagonise France, which was much more strategically significant to it than New Zealand, offered no condemnation despite the continued ties that did exist[27]. The British too, aware of the tenuous nature of relations amongst European Community nations, also avoided involvement. Attempts to restore New Zealand's standing as a reliable ally were evident such as the contribution made to the United States sponsored United Nations force sent to Iran in 1991. Seizing the opportunity to again play a part in the Western collective security system and renew contact with both Britain and the United States it was quick to pledge support[28]. This offer of support was made despite the potentially negative impact of such a move upon the trade links it was beginning to develop in the area and is evidence of the sort of careful management small state theories predict are the result of the lack of leverage and vulnerability such states often experience.

However, considering the threat the Americans believed this action posed to the "overall fabric of Western security" and the lack of reasons for it to tread carefully, the

treatment of New Zealand by both the Americans and others internationally appears very lenient[29]. Perhaps unwilling to be seen as the aggressor, especially where a small state was concerned, the American reaction was tempered. The Americans also faced constraints that New Zealand, albeit by chance, was able to exploit thus avoiding harsh repercussions. Because the anti-nuclear issue had become such a world-wide sensitive one the United States had to tread carefully. "Lange highlighted the fact that the United States seemed to be bullying a small and loyal ally when the door remained open for further negotiations"[30]. The Americans therefore had to be seen to respond to the perceived disloyalty yet were anxious not to sour relations with other allies who also had strong anti-nuclear views such as the Scandinavian countries. Thus the potential for costs, which small state theorists emphasise, appear to have been avoided. In this case the benefits of small size and the wider international context interacted in such a way as to have outweighed the disadvantages in a manner small state theories do not account for. The easing of the Cold War which occurred in the latter part of the 1980's also altered the international environment in New Zealand's favour. Super power relations improved bringing with it progress on arms control and a weakening of the power blocs. "Inevitably this change in climate made things easier for small countries that wished to pursue independent initiatives" and thus its actions were set in a new context which was more favourable[31]. The British threats as to possible consequences came to nothing and it did in fact allow for a greater flow of information into New Zealand, at least informally, to offset what had been lost[32]. The Australians too made it clear that the trans-Tasman link would not be affected by the dispute. When examining the decision to ban nuclear ships and its aftermath it is necessary therefore to look to the external conditions New Zealand was responding to, and working within, to understand how it was able to act in a manner contrary to that which small state theories predict.

The consequences of New Zealand's attempts to reduce the costs incurred did however act to dilute the significance of the initiative. McMillan refers to the fundamental contradiction that developed within its nuclear ships policy claiming that "the government had clearly demonstrated that, having implemented the policy banning nuclear ships, it then put New Zealand's international relations before any favour that it would gain at home by using international forums to make the case against the nuclear deterrent"[33]. Therefore although appearing to take the initiative with little regard to the potential negative consequences it acted quickly to limit the damage and did not grasp the opportunity to push the issue further. The decision to ban nuclear ships came from public pressure in response to the growing support for the global anti-nuclear movement, particularly that of Britain and Australia, yet once

the decision was made and the disapproval of its allies registered New Zealand was quick to avoid any further alienation through careful diplomatic manoeuvring.

It must also be noted that the decision itself was made out of the fear of nuclear proliferation not as a result of dissatisfaction with the alliance. Therefore whilst appearing in its behaviour to counter small state theorists claims that it is necessary for such states to align themselves with more powerful nations to meet their security needs this was not the case. The decision was evidence of New Zealand responding to fears as to the nature of the threats posed to it, as had been the case when ANZUS was formed. Thus the break up of the alliance was not based upon genuine dissatisfaction with traditional alliance structures but was the result of its anti-nuclear stance and one that was regretted throughout the period with significant diplomatic energy and resources spent in its attempts to compensate for the loss. Small state theories which focus upon the limited capabilities of such states appear in this case to be valid as New Zealand, in its attempts to provide for its security in a changing environment, not only lost the support of a major ally but also incurred costs in its attempts to compensate.

The significance of the changing international environment must therefore be taken in to account in an examination of the impetus for New Zealand's stance on the nuclear issue and its subsequent actions. Growing support for the anti-nuclear movement globally and the increased awareness of the dangers posed which could only be solved at the international level was reflected within the country to the extent that the issue became one of domestic politics. The anti-nuclear movement within New Zealand found its roots in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain and the Labour Party line was closely aligned to that of its Australian counterpart[34]. In the arguments aimed at appeasing the Americans, international comparisons were also drawn upon whereby New Zealand sought to justify its actions by alluding to the global dimensions of the movement and the changing nature of alliance structures. Parallels with the powerful peace movements in Germany and Japan were emphasised as were alliance partnerships that involved conditions as found in Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Denmark[35]. Therefore the significance of the international environment and its corresponding effect upon New Zealand's actions can not be overlooked. Although the first country to apply such conditions on an alliance relationship with the United States, the pressure internally from the peace movement, which found its roots abroad, and the global nature of the nuclear issue prompted the decision. That New Zealand felt it was able to take such an initiative where Australia failed to, even when its Labour Party gained power, is perhaps illustration of the varying constraints each

faced. Australia as a middle-sized power, geographically more exposed than New Zealand clearly felt more constrained in its desire to maintain the United States security guarantee. It is the interaction between influence at the international level and factors that relate to size therefore that shaped this foreign policy initiative.

Small state theories often refer to the moral nature of the foreign policy of such states although as examined some debate exists as to the validity of this claim. The morality of the anti-nuclear stance New Zealand adopted in this period itself reflects this debate. Although in appearance setting a moral example, its actions following the passing of the Nuclear Free Bill undermined the genuine nature of such claims. In its attempts to appease the Americans it avoided pushing its case beyond the South Pacific region and its attempts at compromise watered down the original initiative. The impetus behind the decision was an awareness of the growing global anti-nuclear movement also, therefore it represented the following of international trends .

The potential for personal and bureaucratic influence make an examination of the role of individual policy-makers and the bureaucracy useful in an understanding of the foreign policy of this period. David Lange became a strong advocate of the anti-nuclear movement and once elected he voiced his views strongly, gaining much domestic political support. However in doing so he was instrumental in antagonising the United States in a manner uncharacteristic of small states in alliances with more powerful allies. Thus when the Labour party were defeated in 1990, although they were unable to reverse the decision due to popular support, considerable progress was made in healing the rift between New Zealand and the United States. The influence of the bureaucracy over foreign policy formulation was also evident. On the recomendation of his foreign policy advisers Lange did temper his anti-nuclear rhetoric abroad to prevent further alienation. These factors combined therefore emphasise the necessity of looking to internal domestic factors to aid in the understanding of the decisions made.

1987 DEFENCE REVIEW

As it became evident that New Zealand could no longer secure its defence interests in conventional terms within the ANZUS alliance the government decided to undergo an extensive defence review. Its decision to ban nuclear ships, which in effect ended its close association with the United States and its reliance upon the concept of nuclear deterrence, had drastically limited the national options in the defence field[36]. A review was therefore initiated which for the first time incorporated a large public component. The results of the review released in 1987 took into account the findings of a public

opinion poll which was carried out the year before covering issues such as threat perception, alliances, the nuclear ship ban and preferred defence options. The report concluded that as little or no immediate threat of invasion posed itself defence efforts should be focused on credible and feasible lower level threats while maintaining a basis for expansion should more serious threats emerge[37]. The centrality of the ANZAC relationship was reaffirmed with a focus on self-reliance in partnership with Australia, while ANZUS continued to be of significance but in conventional terms only[38]. It was this review therefore which set the agenda for New Zealand's foreign policy for the rest of the period with the emphasis being on regional concerns and the trans-Tasman relationship, trade, the United Nations and a return to ANZUS in conventional terms only which all require closer examination.

AUSTRALIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

The defence review listed as its main goal the achievement of greater self-reliance in attaining its security yet the help of Australia was perceived to be central to this. The review stressed the basic identity of concerns and the common strategic interests New Zealand and Australia shared as the basis for a partnership that would provide a "credible South Pacific-oriented defence posture"[39]. Such a reliance upon a partner to achieve its security goals is a characteristic small state theories highlight as a means by which a total expenditure can be reached that would otherwise exceed a small states capabilities. A relationship of this nature has however costs which advocates of this theory believe act to impinge upon a small states autonomy. Nonetheless it was to Australia that it turned in an attempt to regain the security guarantees that it had experienced as a member of the fully functioning ANZUS alliance. An examination of the nature of the relationship therefore and the commitments New Zealand was expected to make as part of the alliance is necessary to ascertain if it experienced the costs that theorists believe impinge upon a small states autonomy.

In the conclusion of the Defence Review co-operation with Australia was stressed on the basis of shared history and strategic concerns. The Australian Defence Review of the same year acknowledged the viability of such a relationship but stressed that it would be dependent upon a compatibility of equipment and of the capabilities of the two forces[40]. Australia was quick therefore to request the acquisition of compatible frigates as a "litmus test on whether New Zealand was serious about trans-Tasman defence co-operation"[41]. The cost of acquiring the desired frigates was high however and disapproval within the country resulted in protests. Following a warning by the Australian Prime Minister of the possible adverse economic effects of a failure to meet their request the government agreed on a compromise, a commitment to buy two instead of four frigates. It also agreed that as an ally of Australia it would "provide

assistance wherever it was required for Australia's defence, including Papua New Guinea" and consent to a long-term Skyhawks training programme was given[42]. The Skyhawks being more suited to conventional warfare over large land areas were clearly more useful to Australia's defence planning yet New Zealand in its willingness to illustrate its commitment readily agreed[43].

It can be seen therefore that the partnership with Australia which New Zealand sought to replace the United States security guarantee with, incurred considerable costs as small state theories prescribe. Not only was it committed to the acquisition of costly equipment which had been kept to a minimum under the ANZUS alliance but it was involved in training exercises more suited to Australia's defence than its own. Its immediate area of strategic concern was widened as the geographical boundaries were allowed to be dictated by the Australians whose interests stretched to South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean. This extension of New Zealand's regional defence focus to include South-east Asia proved to be immensely stressful on its resources and thus its foreign policy considerations while contributing little in real terms to the security of that region[44]. Australia had clearly adopted the position of leader in the alliance pressuring New Zealand to buy the equipment they required and establishing the geographical priorities thus taking away its autonomy to assess and plan for its own defence.

As small state theories predict the costs were therefore high and Australia proved to be a harder task-master than ANZUS had ever been[45]. Having lost American support however New Zealand faced a lack of alternatives and keenly aware of its limitations it was evident that its desire to achieve self-reliance was dependent upon Australian backing. Thus the costs of the Australian relationship were high but were borne willingly out of necessity as the clear side-effect of its anti-nuclear policy. When, with the change of government in 1990, the desire to return to a more international outlook was voiced the importance of Australia's support was considered tantamount. Especially so when faced with the continued reluctance of the United States to accept New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. "Even restored 'globalism' had to be on Australian coat-tails"[46]. Thus the dependence upon Australia not only illustrates its unwillingness or inability to finance true self-reliance but the relationship was clearly not one of equals, with the Australians taking the leadership role and dictating the terms. As in the earlier period New Zealand let itself be dominated by Australia, both in establishing the areas of strategic concern and planning for its defence, as well as providing the means by which it could regain its standing internationally.

The Defence Review of 1987 also concluded that due to the lack of more far reaching threats to New Zealand's security, the South Pacific area become the primary focus. This emphasis on its immediate strategic environment would appear to correspond to small state theories in that such states are often seen to maintain a narrow focus in foreign affairs to reduce the costs incurred and enable a concentration of their scarce resources. New Zealand perceived the major threats regionally to its security to be economic instability and vulnerability in its area of direct strategic concern thus policies directed at development as well as military co-operation were implemented[47]. In the South Pacific progress on establishing security and mutual confidence-building dialogue was centred on ASEAN, with Australia's partnership[48]. The coup in Fiji in 1987, the Port Vila riots in Vanuatu in 1989 and the continuing conflict in Papua New Guinea gave evidence of the need for concern and so, despite budgetary pressures, it continued to focus on the South Pacific opening two new diplomatic posts in the region in Vanuatu and Kiribati[49].

Regional surveillance systems were also established to compensate for the loss of international intelligence as a result of the break with the United States, clear evidence of a narrowing of its focus to more affordable alternatives as small state theories prescribe. Throughout the period aid schemes were also extended as were tourist links with Asia . The threat posed by French nuclear testing in the Pacific was also a major concern and New Zealand worked within the South Pacific Forum to push for change, evidence again of the benefit to a small state of involvement in multilateral initiatives where otherwise it may have difficulty having its voice heard. It signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1986 and pushed the South Pacific's anti-nuclear message through other international forums.

However, with the change of government in 1990, came criticism of this inward-looking, insular focus. National criticised the South Pacific focus as parochial and others went so far as to claim that it was the "result of disappointment, frustration and disillusionment with older associations and their consequences, and a reluctance to accept the world as it was"[50]. Prime Minister Bolger therefore acknowledging the constraints limiting its ability to act independently in all but low-level military emergencies stressed the need to co-operate with like-minded nations[51]. The 1991 Defence Review reflected this new outlook in its goal of returning to a more traditional Western collective security orientation. However, in light of the lack of progress in reaching a compromise with the Americans over its anti-nuclear stance, it acknowledged the necessity of retaining Australia's support to enable a return to alliance participation. The desire to achieve self-reliance was also foreseen only in

partnership with Australia thus acknowledging its inability to finance such a move independently. Many of the initiatives it embarked upon in the Pacific and Asia were either in partnership with Australia or through multilateral organisations. The relationship with Australia proved costly and due to the unequal nature of the alliance New Zealand experienced a lose of autonomy within it. Therefore as small state theorists prescribe it was forced by economic constraints into an alliance that although providing for security that it could not otherwise hope to attain, acted to increase its area of strategic concern and impinge upon its autonomy. Later as criticism within the country grew as to this narrowing focus the importance of Australia became even more evident as New Zealand's inability to reach a compromise with the Americans left it with little political voice other than in partnership with Australia.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Small state theories highlight the role international organisations and their laws have the potential to play in the foreign policy of such states. They provide a cost-efficient means by which states with limited resources can exert influence and thus enable them to pursue their national interests in a broader arena than would otherwise be feasible. The ability to form coalitions within such organisations also heightens their effectiveness as a tool enabling small states to attain their foreign policy goals. New Zealand by 1984 had long since established itself as a strong supporter of the United Nations keenly aware of the benefits it offered and this record continued. Alongside the desire to secure greater self-reliance in its defence policy the 1987 Defence Review placed important emphasis upon New Zealand's active membership in the United Nations during this period. Although in the early 1980's it had experienced a decline in favour within the organisation due its decision to allow the Springboks to tour despite the United Nations call to halt all such contact, in 1984 Labour made moves to repair this damage. Citing the wish to ensure its defence policy was in line with the United Nations and the peace-keeping needs of the organisation, Labour retrieved its role in the maintenance of international pressure on South Africa[52]. Once this was achieved New Zealand for the remainder of the period devoted "considerable diplomatic effort and financial resources to multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations"[53].

New Zealand adopted a strong role in the peacekeeping activities of the organisation at times contributing aid despite the possible repercussions. In 1991 its troops were part of the Sinai Multinational Force and observers were stationed in Lebanon and along the Iran/Iraq border[54]. Considering New Zealand's history of 'even-handed' policies in the Middle East due to the increasing importance of the area to attempts to diversify its trade markets this contribution was potentially damaging. "The Labour government went to quite extraordinary lengths to find a formula which amounted to

significant 'involvement' in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter, but falling short of 'military' commitment"[55]. Thus evidence of the careful management that small state theorists identify as characteristic of such states was clear in New Zealand's actions. This need to walk a delicate path was further complicated by a desire to prove itself a valuable member of the Western collective security system in its bid to win back American favour. As in the earlier period its commitment to the United Nations can in this case not be separated from the benefits it perceived to be gained from presenting itself as a willing contributor. At the end of the period New Zealand had 200 personnel in five United Nations operations in Africa, Europe and Asia as well as observers in Cambodia[56].

The attempts New Zealand made in this period to improve the operation of the United Nations appear somewhat more altruistic. With the shifts in the international environment which occurred with the easing of the Cold War the organisation was freed from many of the constraints that had acted to stifle its effectiveness and there was unprecedented growth its peacekeeping operations. Seizing the opportunity, lobbying for a seat on the Security Council was undertaken in 1992. The seat was secured in October with considerable aid from both the Canadians and the Australians who pushed its case[57]. New Zealand had also inadvertently made itself a more acceptable candidate due to its split with the Americans which was seen to make it a more independent actor on the international stage[58].The Minister of External Relations and Trade on accepting the seat claimed New Zealand came to the Security Council "with credentials as a strong supporter of the United Nations and an effective representative of the interests of small states" [59].

In the following year as a member of the Security Council it took part in setting up a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and undertook a fact finding mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina[60]. It was also involved in attempts to reform the structure of the Security Council and the way it handled its mandate. It criticised initiatives of the major powers which sought to obtain Council endorsement for largely unilateral operations and in so doing called for greater transparency in its decision making[61]. In a review of its membership of the United Nations Templeton claims that on the Security Council New Zealand had a freer hand due to its geographical remoteness, highly diversified trade and its lack of other vulnerability's which enabled it to exercise an independent voice and to take risks with some success[62]. However such a claim underestimates the degree of self-interest in its involvement in the United Nations. Not only did contributions to the organisation provide a means by which New Zealand could re-establish its position as a valuable member of the collective security system

but it enabled its armed forces to get the overseas training and experience that it no longer could through ANZUS[63]. Despite domestic economic conditions that put a strain on its United Nations involvement, it continued due to the potential global and regional benefits it offered a small state, as such theories predict. Whilst appearing in the 1990's to have adopted a disproportionately active role in world military affairs, upon examination the underlying motivations appear to correspond to small state theories as to the potential benefits international laws and organisations offer such states.

Within the United Nations many of the initiatives it was involved in were multilateral in nature in its attempts to have its voice heard as small state theorists predict. In 1986 the seven South Pacific Forum members in the United Nations coalesced into a caucus which successfully lobbied to re-inscribe the question of decolonisation of New Caledonia on the agenda with New Zealand in part providing leadership[64]. New Zealand took a strong role in the environmental and disarmament efforts of the organisation also. In 1989 it was elected for a four year term to the governing council of the United Nations Environmental Programme and it was one of the three principle sponsors of a resolution calling for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons which with the thawing of the Cold War was agreed with consensus for the first time[65]. When membership on the Security Council was achieved it was with the strong support and lobbying of others and in its role in promoting South Pacific concerns ASEAN consultations and Australian partnership were invaluable[66]. The success these initiatives were met with was however more as a result of the changing international environment and the corresponding freeing-up of the organisation than an indication of New Zealand's ability to enforce its policies. The leadership of many of these multilateral initiatives lay with others.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

Small state theories focus upon the limited resources and markets commonly experienced by such states and the corresponding vulnerability to adverse international trends which often accompany such characteristics. The external economic dependence and sensitivity thus experienced heightens the risk of foreign penetration and means small state foreign policy cannot afford to be isolated from trade concerns or relationships. The focus of a small states foreign policy is therefore characterised by a clear economic focus and carefully managed to avoid upsetting established trading patterns or markets. New Zealand although having achieved some diversification in both product and markets was still clearly in a vulnerable position economically at the outset of this period and as such would be expected to exhibit the characteristics small

state theories highlight. The United Kingdom's joining of the European Community had left New Zealand aware of the need to diversify its markets, in conjunction with attempts to maintain access to the bloc. Alliance partners provided valuable potential for alternative markets with both Australia and America taking ever increasing percentages of our total exports. However despite attempts at diversification, trade represented a considerable security concern for New Zealand and as such an important aspect of its foreign policy. "Many of the most immediate threats to New Zealand's national well-being and security in recent years have arisen not from any military threats but rather from the possible loss of export markets because of politically imposed constraints to agricultural trade"[67]. As primarily an agricultural producer New Zealand was therefore faced with the necessity to tread carefully to avoid adverse economic conditions whilst working to reduce protectionism globally.

Despite the emphasis that small state theorists place on the need to carefully manage foreign policy to avoid economic consequences New Zealand began this period by announcing its decision to ban nuclear ships. The United States responded by severing military ties and threatened the possibility of economic sanctions also. The British too hinted at possible repercussions on the ongoing European Community access negotiations however neither came to fruition[68]. This may be attributed to careful diplomacy once the announcement was made as neither the United States or the United Kingdom had any incentive to treat New Zealand with special care. The lack of sanctions imposed would seem to defy the negative aspects of size theorists emphasise in the area of trade and the economy. In the following year, despite continued military sanctions, trade to North America rose by 49.14 percent and trade to the European Community and Western Europe also rose[69]. Negotiations with the European Community had already begun to prove more difficult in the early 1980's but as a result of the 1984 decision New Zealand was forced to negotiate with the Commission on its own at the next meeting[70]. Continued access was however still achieved and at consequent negotiations Britain again took up its case. New Zealand benefited from pre-existing links with the United Kingdom which it was able to exploit in maintaining access, a characteristic not addressed by small state theories. Here again both the external context within which foreign policy was formulated and envronmental determinants must be examined to understand the divergence from traditional small state behaviour when exhibited.

There was however one incident in which New Zealand was unable to prevent the use of economic sanctions against it thus exhibiting the economic vulnerability small state theorists believe characterise such states. After the bombing of the Greenpeace boat

the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour and the subsequent trial and imprisonment of the French agents held responsible, the French government imposed sanctions on New Zealand lamb exports in retaliation [71]. Whilst not representing a major upset to its trade or economy it did however emphasis its potential vulnerability's and, the lack of support from its allies in condemning this action, its lose of standing in the international community. In this instance New Zealand's dependency and vulnerability as a small state were particularly evident. Internationally it was unable to get even its allies support as the French represented a far stronger and more strategically significant state.

During the period New Zealand endeavoured to establish new markets for its products with the Middle East proving significant. The delicacy of negotiations however became evident in 1991 with the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, and here evidence of careful management was clear. It attempted to maintain the policy of even-handedness that it had established in the Middle East yet was anxious to meet the United States requests for the United Nations involvement. It walked a delicate path in an attempt to make a commitment "which would permit a flexible response to the United States in terms of an international peace conference, while maintaining good economic and political relations with neighbouring Iran and the other littoral states of the Gulf..."[72]. It appeared New Zealand succeeded in this endeavour as talks aimed at fostering trade continued with Iran after the conclusion of the war thus again it was able to overcome the difficulties small state theories attribute in the area of trade.

In line with the regional focus announced following the Defence Review and the subsequent desire to broaden this to the Asian Pacific region new trade links were established in this area hence attempting to overcome the constraints small states often face as regards narrow markets. By 1991 South Korea had become the fourth largest market and soon after economic links with Vietnam were established[73]. Australia too began to take on a new significance as the policy of Closer Economic Relations(CER) was adopted. CER negotiations continued throughout this period achieving progress on the elimination of trade barriers with Australia. However Europe and the United Kingdom remained its most significant and stable trade destination and this was reflected in New Zealand's preoccupation with European Community negotiations and the successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of GATT in this period. Faced with a powerful bloc like the European Community it was clear it lacked bargaining power as small state theories predict. In negotiations it played on the United Kingdom's sense of responsibility stressing historical ties in an attempt to maintain access[74]. This approach met with moderate success in that the United Kingdom remained the biggest

and most stable market for two of New Zealand's most important exports, butter and lamb. Thus it seems it was again able to rise above the constraints small state theories emphasis and achieve success even where it had little leverage. To understand how this was achieved its colonial heritage must be taken into account.

The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations was also a major area of concern as international trade and emerging trade blocs were beginning to take on greater significance. As a small state reliant upon a limited range of products and markets New Zealand was finding itself increasingly disadvantaged when faced with the protectionist measures such blocs often implement. However as small state theories prescribe it managed to achieve some success by exerting influence through multilateral initiatives. Globally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic power was becoming more important than military and even the United States focus shifted from foreign to domestic concerns[75]. In such a climate New Zealand was able to join with like-minded nations in its attempts to not only conclude the GATT Round but to add agricultural concerns to the agenda. The Cairns Group formed in 1987 and including representatives of ten developing countries along with Australia, Canada, Hungary and New Zealand aimed to co-ordinate a strategy for efficient agriculture exporting countries to put forward initiatives to the Uruguay Round. The Cairns Group worked alongside the United States. This further aided its effectiveness as the leverage afforded to the United States in Europe drastically increased with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This lead to instability in the area which required the assistance of American military might to contain it. Within the Cairns Group New Zealand and Australia worked closely together as they did in the Eminent Persons Group on World Trade, another multilateral initiative aimed at pushing for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Despite such initiatives however the success met with was limited as agriculture remained largely excluded from the scope of negotiations mostly due to European Community and Japanese resistance[76].

It is evident therefore that New Zealand did experience the vulnerability's small state theories believe characterise such states in the international trade arena. It was effected by adverse trends it had little power over and unless initiatives were embarked upon with like-minded nations little could be done to counter such conditions. Even then these initiatives were met with limited success unless the aid of the United States could be enlisted. At times however it was seen to rise above the constraints it faced in a way small state theories do not account for. In its negotiations with the European Community continued access was agreed upon, although at a decreasing rate, despite

the lack of bargaining power New Zealand maintained. The lack of trade sanctions following the ANZUS dispute was also fortunate as the United States had little incentive to treat it with care. Assumptions that traditional alliance structures assist economic aims by providing stable markets must therefore be tempered as despite the break in ANZUS trade with the United States continued to grow[77]. In partnership with Australia New Zealand was able to re-establish dialogue on economic and trade policy with the United States and exert influence it could not have otherwise, whilst establishing between the two mutually beneficial trade relations. Thus the constraints it faced as a small state were altered by the international balance of power and environmental determinants which must be taken into account if New Zealand's foreign policy is to be adequately explained.

1984-1994: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SMALL STATE?

It is clear upon examination that in this period New Zealand did experience conditions small state theorists identify as characteristic. Economically it was prone to vulnerability due to the limited range of its products for export as well as its markets. Internationally protectionist measures beyond its control or influence were making diversification difficult and attempts to influence such trends were met with limited success. Traditional markets were also effected by these trends as is evident in Britain's membership in the European Community and faced with such a powerful organisation the leverage New Zealand maintained was clearly diminishing. Both the United States and the United Kingdom were quick when the ANZUS dispute erupted to threaten economic sanctions making New Zealand acutely aware of its tenuous position and lack of influence. The need to protect markets already established therefore involved an element of political quiescence on New Zealand's part as small state theorists predict and careful management was seen throughout as evident in the debate as to the nature of the contribution to the Iran/Iraq War.

New Zealand's security arrangements in this period also conform to the pattern small state theorists identify as characteristic. It was, faced with limited human and material resources, aware of its inability to defend its own territory as had been the case in the earlier period. However now the most prominent perceived threat was identified as that posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation. In an attempt to meet this threat the decision was made to ban nuclear ship visits, a decision with consequences that proved costly due to the limitations it experienced as a small state. The relationship with Australia, adopted in an attempt to compensate for the loss of the United States security guarantee, proved to be more costly both in the acquisitions it deemed necessary and in the breadth of the contribution expected whilst the shortfalls of the

relationship were clear. The Australians' assumed leadership and the economic strain it imposed upon New Zealand acted to impinge upon its autonomy as small state theories predict.

However it is necessary to examine the wider international context to understand why this policy was adopted. The decision to enact the nuclear ship ban, whilst appearing to disregard the notion that small states must carefully manage their affairs with regard to alliance partners, was made in the belief that nuclear weapons represented the most pressing security concern it faced and on the assumption that the American response would not be as uncompromising as it was. Attempts to win back American favour then characterised the rest of the period with considerable diplomatic effort being expended to regain the security guarantee it had lost and which it could not hope to meet alone. This resulted in an element of political quiescence on New Zealand's behalf as it resisted the opportunity to push its anti-nuclear stance abroad so as not to further alienate itself. This inaction undermined the significance of its stance due to the nature of the issue, requiring as it did international co-operation if it was to be successful in halting the world wide proliferation of nuclear weapons. It can be seen therefore that New Zealand's independence of action in this period was, as small state theories prescribe, necessarily restricted by its defence commitments and trade arrangements. Lacking the resources to provide for its own security and vulnerable to international pressure with regards to trade it was necessary to adopt foreign policies aimed at alleviating these conditions. As small state theories highlight these policies however often resulted in a loss of autonomy or in political quiescence.

Small state theorists identify the need for such states to carefully manage their foreign policy behaviour and decision-making to avoid confrontation. The risks involved can therefore be minimised and the costs kept to a level within a small states potential to meet. Evidence of such careful management in the policies adopted by the New Zealand government during this period is clear. As already established once the decision to ban nuclear ships was made a policy aimed at avoiding further confrontation with America was adopted. It argued the policy was anti-nuclear not anti-American and throughout made attempts to reach a compromise. The stance was deemed 'not for export' and the geographical realities of its position stressed, as the justification for the policy therefore excluded its viability for others in the Western alliance system. Through the United Nations it also sought to regain favour by supporting United States sponsored initiatives such as involvement in the Iran/Iraq War in 1991 despite the potential costs involvement incurred. Aware of the need to re-establish itself as a valuable and reliable ally this contribution was made willingly.

In its relationship with the United Kingdom, especially with regard to the European Community, a similar pattern is evident. Although decreasing steadily, the United Kingdom still provided the largest and most stable market for its agricultural produce and thus negotiations with the European Community over continued access required careful handling. Considering the lack of leverage it maintained over the Community, the support of the United Kingdom was essential in presenting its case. The relationship with Australia, stressed in its bid to compensate for the loss of American support, also required careful management. This resulted in New Zealand accepting a wider area of strategic importance than it would have otherwise as well as capitulation to Australian pressure in the acquisition of costly military hardware. As small state theories predict therefore it was, due to the limitations it faced, forced to comply with the wishes of its more powerful allies or adopt behavioural restrictions in the management of its alliance relations to avoid costly alternatives or consequences.

International laws and organisations are a tool often utilised by small states according to theorists and again New Zealand was seen to follow this pattern during the 1984-1994 period. It re-established its standing in the organisation following the debate over sporting contact with South Africa and adopted an active policy within, culminating in membership on the Security Council in 1992. The initiatives it was seen to support during the period were as small state theories predict primarily multilateral in nature. Thus ascertaining leadership is difficult and the influence of Australia can not be overlooked. The thawing of the Cold War and the subsequent increase in the potential for successful initiatives within the organisation is also significant during this period. In such an environment small states in collaboration were able to achieve a degree of influence which had previously not been possible. New Zealand's involvement in such initiatives must therefore be put into context and the impetus attributed in a large degree to the changing international environment to which it was responding. In this changing world structure it was becoming evident also that within the United Nations success of any initiative was dependent upon the United States which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, represented the most powerful nation. Considering the tenuous nature of the relationship between New Zealand and America this connection is not insignificant in shaping the direction New Zealand took during the period with many of the resolutions it adopted being those sponsored or supported by the United States. Again therefore the external context was instrumental in shaping foreign policy.

Other tools and tactics New Zealand adopted in this period correspond with those believed to be peculiar to small states. Theorists maintain that due to resource constraints the nature, operation and effectiveness of a small states foreign policy is

characterised by the use of tools which minimise the costs incurred. A narrow focus in foreign policy is one such characteristic and there is clear evidence of this in the tactics New Zealand adopted in this ten year period. Following the withdrawal of American support the 1987 Defence Review stressed the need to focus on the immediate region with the aid of Australia. Due to an awareness of the limitations New Zealand faced with regard to providing for its own security there was little other choice available to it than to deliberately narrow its focus to an area it could more feasibly cover. Even then however this could only be achieved in partnership with another. By co-operating with other like-minded nations, another tactic believed to characterise small states, New Zealand was also able to achieve some of its policy aims. Initiatives it supported in both the United Nations and in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations were multilateral in nature and thus afforded greater success than it could have hoped to achieved alone. The question of leadership does however pose itself as it becomes difficult to ascertain New Zealand's role in such initiatives given Australian involvement and the dominant position that country had adopted.

New Zealand's involvement in economic and developmental programmes in this period is further evidence of the type of foreign policy behaviour that small state theorists believe to be characteristic. In its regional focus the necessity of attaining security through such policies was emphasised due to the cost efficient nature of such an approach. The policies it adopted reflected this therefore with increases evident in many of its aid programs in the South Pacific. Once again however many of these were in collaboration with Australia.

The use of persuasion or rhetoric is another tool theorists identify as characterising small state foreign policy as both provide a cheap means of pursuing a goal. New Zealand in its negotiations with the European Community adopted such an approach in its attempts to retain the United Kingdom's support of its case. Lacking other forms of leverage it stressed historical ties thus appealing to Britain's sense of responsibility to its former colony. A similar method was utilised in convincing Australia of the viability of partnership. Creating good-will through its actions was another tactic New Zealand utilised in this period which corresponds to the behaviour small states theorists see as characteristic. In its contribution to the Gulf War of 1991 it saw the opportunity to regain some of the status that it had lost within the Western alliance and therefore was willing to do so despite the potential consequences to the markets it was establishing in the area. Behaviour of this nature typifies small states which lack the resources to more actively pursue their foreign policy.

The impact of Lange on New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance is evidence of the potential for personal influence in the foreign policy of small states, yet this was diluted at the insistence of his advisers thus exhibiting characteristics associated with the bureaucratic approach to the study of foreign policy. The impact of the domestic political environment was also a strong factor in the anti-nuclear stance as evident by the change of Nationals policy leading up to their election success. The divergence of policy over the nuclear ship issue between National and Labour at the outset of the period diminished as the political realities of the situation became evident. National increasingly aware of the popularity of the decision altered its stance on the issue before the 1990 election which then resulted in their success. Therefore the change of government did little to alter the direction of its foreign policy. Although National remained critical of the policy that had resulted in the narrowing of its outlook it was aware of their necessity in light of the popularity of the decision domestically. Thus domestic considerations must be taken into account.

Within small state theories the debate as to the moral nature of small state foreign policy has been examined and, as with the first period, New Zealand's stance during the years 1984-1994 reflects this debate. Although appearing to take the moral high ground over the nuclear issue its response to the criticism it experienced undermined this stance. To avoid further American disapproval it failed to pursue the issue internationally, a step necessary if the initiative was to achieve any significant progress. A fundamental contradiction therefore developed within its anti-nuclear policy that was not reconciled until the international environment altered and attempts at disarmament made real progress.

In conclusion therefore New Zealand did experience the constraints that typify small states and as such its foreign policy exhibited the characteristics theorists identify. Due to the limitations it experienced as a result of size it remained dependent and vulnerable. This was particularly evident in the failure of New Zealand to rally international support in condemning the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior. Its actions reflected this vulnerability in its security arrangements as well as trade, with careful management characterising these alliances. When it failed in its careful maintenance of these relationships, although the sanctions experienced were not great, much diplomatic energy was expended in attempts to reinstate them and alternatives adopted to compensate proved costly. The Australian relationship was attributed such significance that it resulted in a loss of autonomy on New Zealand's behalf and as such dictated much of the direction its foreign policy followed. As with the first period the significance of the relationship with Australia must therefore occupy a central part in

the study of New Zealand's foreign policy as it was in this close partnership with a middle-sized state that it developed its approach. Thus alternative theories that examine the wider context and the external parties involved would prove to be of use in these circumstances. The significance of the international environment must also be taken into account as much of New Zealand's foreign policy was a manifestation of global trends, such as the anti-nuclear movement. The changing international environment made it possible for small states to achieve policy aims through the United Nations and other organisations which had not been possible previously, especially when acting in collaboration with others. The need to acknowledge the influence of the wider environment upon the foreign policy of a small state appears therefore to be necessary in this instance if the model is to be of use in the study of New Zealand foreign policy during this period. The leverage it was able to achieve, despite the lack of resources it maintained, and the avoidance of harsh sanctions as a result of its behaviour also appear to counter small state theorists claims. New Zealand, in part because of its small size and vulnerability, avoided incurring costs that theorists believe its size and lack of leverage would have made unavoidable. Thus traditional small state theories not only fail to acknowledge the impact of global trends but also the potential benefits available to such states due to their size. In conclusion therefore whilst providing some explanation as to the direction of New Zealand's foreign policy from 1984-1994 small state theories prove inadequate in their failure to acknowledge the significance of changes in the international environment as well as the prominence of Australia's role in shaping its policy. It is in the interaction between variables from all perspectives that a more comprehensive understanding can be achieved.

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CONCLUSION

After studying the foreign policy of New Zealand in the two designated time periods the question to be asked is whether the criticisms made of traditional small state theories were evident and if so can the alternative model proposed meet these criticisms. Criticism followed two lines: one focussing on the failure of such models to account for diversity, the other emphasising the changing international environment. Small state theory, originating as it did from studies based in Europe, is criticised for failing to accommodate the increasingly diverse nature of such states. The early literature also primarily concerned itself with the question of viability. With the increase in number of international actors and organisations diffusing power, as well as increased regionalism and fragmentation, critics perceive small states to be less constrained in their actions, thus the question of viability is no longer as significant. Critics maintain that by failing to integrate wider explanatory variables small state theories lack the ability to account for change and diversity. When traditional small state theories are applied to New Zealand there is clear evidence of such shortfalls. While in many areas the foreign policy exhibited by New Zealand in both periods did display behaviour characteristic of small states, in other significant areas it was seen to overcome or bypass the constraints it faced. It is in these instances that the role of alternative theories, and their interaction with aspects of size, must examined.

1944-1954

In this early period New Zealand clearly showed evidence of the conditions that small state theories identify. Both economically and physically it found itself dependent upon others to meet its security requirements and was therefore vulnerable to external influence. Tools identified by small state theorists as being characteristic of such states were utilised to alleviate this insecurity, as evident in the alliances maintained with both the Commonwealth and the United States. Within these alliances careful management was evident to avoid incurring undue costs. Its active involvement in the United Nations also appeared to justify small state claims as to a reliance upon international laws and institutions yet the strong Australian leadership provided in this area makes assessing this commitment difficult.

New Zealand's diplomatic service did face constraints of the nature small state theories highlight and the resources it commanded were consequently limited. Tools designed to maximise influence whilst avoiding costs were therefore utilised as small state theories predict. The taking of a moral stance as a foreign policy tool was one such characteristic theorists stress and there was evidence of this in the foreign policy

approach adopted. When it proved useful, such as within the United Nations and during the negoiation of peace settlements after World War Two, it stressed its moral stance. Due to its continued involvement in Europe, as well as an increased awareness of its geographical realities, it did however exhibit a far wider foreign policy focus than would be expected.

Therefore New Zealand clearly exhibited the characteristics theorists associate with small size in this period yet in several significant areas its behaviour diverged from that expected. How and why this occurred proves important, particularly in light of the criticisms levelled at such theories. A significant factor that was influential in shaping foreign policy in this period was its ex-colonial status. New Zealand found itself torn throughout between its loyalty to the United Kingdom and its desire to move towards the United States, at least in terms of security arrangements. This lead to a wider foreign policy focus than small state theorists believe characteristic, therefore lending credibility to criticisms of the Euro-centric nature of the model and its failure to take into account environmental and societal context. The impact of historical or pre-existing ties, as well as geographical location, are not taken into consideration.

In juggling its two major allies New Zealand was also able to take advantage of its position thus overcoming constraints associated with size. Commitments to both the Korean War and the war in Indo-China were stalled using the Commonwealth hesitancy as justification. Careful management enabled New Zealand to retain its close relationship with the United Kingdom whilst securing an American commitment. Claims that by focussing on the limited viability of small states such theories fail to acknowledge the potential benefits appear to hold true in this instance. Similarly New Zealand's relationship with Australia enabled it to benefit from the weight Australia wielded as a middle-sized power without exposing itself to the full-force of potential repercussions. Thus by virtue of its size and the increased manoeuvrability it brought, New Zealand was able to keep the costs associated with its alliances to a minimum.

There is also evidence of the failure of small state theories to account for diversity even prior to the decolonisation of the post-war period which sparked such claims. In this period New Zealand's location played a significant role in shaping its foreign policy as this isolation compounded the weaknesses associated with size. It was out of a realisation of its vulnerability and isolation in the Pacific that New Zealand sought out the American commitment. The close relationship that developed with Australia was also the result of this realisation as well as a shared colonial history. This relationship and the dominant position Australia adopted, were instrumental in New

Zealand's signing of ANZUS, its commitment to the Korean War and its active role in the United Nations.

The impact of external factors and changes in the international environment were also significant in shaping New Zealand's foreign policy between 1944-1954 in a manner small state theories fail to identify. The events of World War Two still dominated the perception of threat thus New Zealand was looking to strengthen its defensive position. This was evident in the relationships developed with both the United States and Australia. As a move occurred from the initial post-war emphasis on international organisations to regional arrangements, as the signing of NATO indicated, New Zealand soon followed. Its attention turned from the United Nations to the establishment of a similar arrangement for the Pacific. This move away from the United Nations, a tool small state theories identify as a cost efficient means of alleviating its security concerns, was necessitated by the failure of the organisation as the emerging Cold War had rendered it virtually powerless.

In this period therefore other variables and characteristics, beyond those attributed to size, were seen to interact in the formulation of its foreign policy thus reflecting its unique historical, cultural, and physical position. Criticisms as to the failure of traditional small state theories to account for diversity appear valid. To achieve a more comprehensive understanding a multi-causal approach of the sort proposed is necessary which, whilst not invalidating small state claims, acknowledges the existence of mediating or contextual variables. Of some significance however is that in these ten years there was evidence of manoeuvrability on New Zealand's behalf, despite falling before changes in the international power balance that critics of small state theories believe create such potential. Therefore small state theories, which acknowledge that even the weakest of states may benefit from temporary shifts in power and the leverage that this may result in, provide a better explanation.

1984-1994

In this period despite the significantly altered international environment New Zealand clearly exhibited the characteristics associated with a small state. Contrary to claims that small state theories were increasingly invalid due to interdependence and the increased opportunities this created for such states to overcome the constraints they faced, it remained dependent and vulnerable. This was particularly evident in the after-math of its nuclear-free decision and the careful management necessary to avoid incurring costs. Instead of pursuing its anti-nuclear stance globally New Zealand, aware of the need not to antagonise its allies further, clearly stated the policy was not

for export. Once the United States announced it was withdrawing its security guarantee New Zealand was forced to narrow its foreign policy focus to its more immediate region aware of its limited resources. The treatment of New Zealand by France following the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior also reinforced its limitations. Whereas proponents of interdependence theories stress the weakening of state boundaries, the rise in supranational organisations and the subsequent easing of constraints on small states as providing increased potential for manoeuvrability and an equal international standing for all states, New Zealand was clearly still constrained in its actions by the resources and power it was able to command.

Economically New Zealand experienced greater vulnerability than was evident in the first period primarily due to the lose of its guaranteed market in the United Kingdom. The protectionist measures increasingly characterising the international market, and the large and powerful trading blocs emerging, also emphasised its lack of power. In these conditions it sought out like-minded nations to lend weight to attempts to protect its interests. Similarly its security arrangements conformed to the patterns small state theories identify. The relationship developed with Australia to compensate for the lose of the American security guarantee in the Pacific was an alliance of the nature believed characteristic and the costs associated with the relationship were high. Careful management of alliance partners was evident throughout the period and when, in the case of America, its actions were met with disapproval a policy aimed at avoiding further confrontation was adopted.

There is further evidence of the use of tools believed to characterise small state behaviour in this period. New Zealand's commitment to the United Nations was for example strengthened in this period as, with the thawing of the Cold War, the potential opportunities for a small state within it grew. Within the United Nations it adopted a strong moral position based on multilateral initiatives to maximise influence. As a consequence of the break in ANZUS it also consciously narrowed its foreign policy focus, aware of the limitations it faced with regard to providing for its own security. Economic and developmental policies characterised its regional initiatives as it sought to create a stable environment. The use of persuasion or rhetoric in achieving its foreign policy aims was also evident. In negotiations with the United Kingdom over continued trading access New Zealand stressed its historical ties and hence a continued sense of responsibility on Britain's behalf. Similarly in its bid to upgrade the Australian alliance after the break in ANZUS, shared history and geographical proximity were highlighted. To regain American favour New Zealand also attempted to establish goodwill primarily by supporting American initiatives in the United Nations. This did

however incur costs as it resulted in a commitment being made to the Gulf War, despite the tenuous nature of the ongoing trade negotiations it was involved in the Middle East. As with the first period New Zealand did stress the moral nature of its foreign policy when it suited, such as over the anti-nuclear stance, however this was subsequently undermined when it failed to push this stance abroad out of the fear of alienating the Americans further.

As with the first period however there was evidence of areas where traditional small state theories failed to adequately explain New Zealand's foreign policy. Its post-colonial status continued to have an impact, not only in its membership of the Commonwealth, but also in the leverage it was able to bring to bear in negotiations with the European Community. The United Kingdom, despite threats to the contrary, argued New Zealand's case, and in a world increasingly characterised by protectionist measures, secured continued access for its exports. Without these historical ties a small state would have had little ground for consideration. New Zealand's continued close relationship with Australia also had a considerable impact. Following its decision to ban nuclear ships and the subsequent split with the United States, it was faced with limited defence options. Australia therefore became central to its security planning, as stated in the 1987 defence review, and was as such in a position to take a dominant role in shaping New Zealand's foreign policy. It was instrumental in establishing the area of direct strategic concern for both states and in planning for their defence.

As with the first period evidence of advantages associated with size can be identified, highlighting the problems associated with the focus of small state theories on viability. In the immediate aftermath of its anti-nuclear decision New Zealand, by emphasising its small size and isolation, was able to avoid harsh repercussions. It was also able to dilute the response by exploiting constraints faced by the United States. That New Zealand carried through with the decision where Australia failed to is indicative of the greater freedom New Zealand experienced. Australia as a larger, geographically more significant state had more to lose. Where in the first period it played the United States and the United Kingdom off against each other to its advantage, in 1991 it used similar techniques to protect its interests in the Middle East while avoiding further alienation of the United States. New Zealand was seen therefore, to not only overcome the constraints associated with its size, but was also able to benefit from it in a manner small state theories fail to acknowledge.

The external environment also impacted greatly on New Zealand's foreign policy in this period. The leadership role provided by Australia shaped much of its foreign

policy, as did its desire to maintain existing security alliances. The decision to ban nuclear ships represented an independent initiative yet the influence of the international environment and the global anti-nuclear movement were significant. Its anti-nuclear stance, as with its renewed commitment to the United Nations, was spurred by global trends. The growth of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand was a direct response to movements elsewhere in the world, brought to its attention through the media and interstate organisations. External pressures were brought to bear and what began as a domestic issue was forced on to the international stage as interdependence theorists predict. There is evidence therefore that the changing global environment impacted upon its foreign policy and thus must be addressed if a more comprehensive understanding is to be achieved.

In both periods therefore whilst small state theories did prove enlightening there is evidence of a need to examine the foreign policy exhibited from different perspectives and levels of analysis, to integrate the perspectives, thus allowing for greater understanding. As outlined in Chapter One an alternative model, aimed at addressing the shortfalls identified, would adopt a more comprehensive approach to the study of foreign policy by examining both domestic political determinants and the impact of the external environment. Given the areas where small state theories failed to identify the factors shaping New Zealand foreign policy in the two periods studied, alternative theories that address environmental and societal determinants appear the most useful.

Aspects of decision making-theory that identify environmental and societal determinants meet the criticisms made of small state theories. Political structures, societal characteristics, historical tradition and geographical location all, by remaining relatively stable, provide for continuity in the field of foreign policy. Thus by studying the constraints imposed and the opportunities provided by the situational context a greater understanding of foreign policy is gained. In the case of New Zealand such an approach accounts for the aspects of its foreign policy where small state theories failed. The influence of its post-colonial status for example was evident in both periods in its continued commitment to and identification with the United Kingdom. This was also seen in the leverage it was still able to bring to negotiations with the European Community. Similarly New Zealand's geographical position and isolation was instrumental in shaping its perception of threat. This was reflected in the means it adopted to attain its security, particularly evident in the close relationship with Australia. New Zealand's decision to ban nuclear ships in the latter period was also largely due to its geographical proximity to French nuclear test sites in the Pacific.

Another criticism aimed at small state theories is that over time they have become less relevant due to the changing international political environment. Theories have developed therefore which focus on the increased evidence of global interdependence and how this has resulted in the weakening of state boundaries. In such an environment all states are limited in their foreign policy by transnational and transgovernmental actors which increase the potential costs involved. If such theories are to prove useful in the study of New Zealand foreign policy one would expect to see a marked change between the two periods with regard to levels of dependence and interaction. However these characteristics were evident throughout. Whilst changes internationally increased the potential for successful coalitions and cooperation in the latter period, it exhibited the characteristics theorists associate with interdependence in both periods thus theories that relate this to constraints that result from size appear more valid. New Zealand in the latter period still clearly developed its foreign policy in response to the limitations it faced due to size and this status was reflected in its treatment internationally. Upon examination therefore the high levels of dependence and interaction that proponents of the interdependence paradigm highlight were evident prior to the changes in the international environment. The characteristics associated with interdependence correspond to those traditionally attributed to the weak and small.

For small state theories to remain valid in the study of New Zealand foreign policy therefore, there are clearly areas where they must be extended if they are to prove comprehensive. Firstly by focussing on the problem of small state viability these theories fail to identify areas where size can prove advantageous. In both periods examined New Zealand was on occasion able to use its size to its advantage. With the increased opportunities brought by the changing nature of global power distribution and interdependence this is an area that small state theories need to address. The failure to acknowledge the role of environmental and societal determinants in the understanding of a states foreign policy is also problematic and is reflected in the inability of such theories to account for the influence of geographical location, historical ties and other external forces. In the case of New Zealand its physical isolation was as significant as size in defining its security agenda. The central role Australia had in shaping its foreign policy in both periods is evidence of this. To make a comprehensive study of New Zealand's foreign policy in both periods therefore it is necessary to acknowledge the interaction of factors both internal and external that impacted upon its capacity to act. Clearly external factors and changes on the international stage acted to alternatively exacerbate or alleviate the constraints it faced as did the unique geographical and historical position it maintained. It is necessary to

recognise the impact of mediating or contextual variables which acted to alter the relationship between size and the foreign policy behaviour exhibited. To exclude such variables is to render the study inadequate thus validating the criticisms outlined at the outset. For this to be avoided a more comprehensive multi-causal approach, as proposed, is necessary which, whilst not discounting the propositions small state theories advocate, acknowledges the interaction between variables and the subsequent impact this has upon a states capacity to act.

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